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ABSTRACT 
Americans were largely surprised when the intelligence community revealed that 
Russia had launched a widespread influence operation focused on the 2016 
U.S. presidential election. With their high-tech, social-media focus, these practices 
struck many as a newly implemented tactic against the United States. However, 
throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed influence 
operations—then called “active measures”—against the United States and its allies. 
During the last decade of the Cold War, the United States actively and systematically 
combatted this threat. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, active 
measures seemed to fade into history as well. This thesis argues that Russia has 
reincarnated this Cold War relic and is using active measures throughout the world 
to advance its strategic interests, especially in its post-Soviet space. Russia is 
utilizing 21st-century technology to gain access to Western populations and sow 
discord, distrust, and disorder. Thus, this thesis examines the Soviet-era active 
measures, the U.S. Cold War countermeasures, and Russian active measures today 
to make recommendations on ways to counter this form of malevolent influence. This 
thesis finds that the United States should organize purposefully and consistently to 
counter Russian active measures, educate the American public to increase its resiliency 
against foreign influence, and intensify its strategic public diplomacy efforts throughout 
Europe. 
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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union notoriously used what it termed “active 
measures” as a tool of influence against the Western world to advance its strategic interests. 
These active measures consisted predominantly of three techniques that relied on 
disinformation and using people or groups to influence a nation’s public or to subvert 
Western governments or policies that negatively affected the Soviet Union. For much of 
the Cold War, the United States ignored these uniquely Soviet tactics of influence. In the 
1980s with the election of a new president, Washington put a great emphasis on combating 
the Soviet Union’s use of active measures and highlighted to the world how the Soviet 
Union manipulated the public, increasing the costs of using active measures. A great 
example was the United States publicizing the Soviet Union’s disinformation campaign 
that Washington created Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as an ethnic 
weapon. Not only did it politically embarrass Gorbachev, but the United States also 
threatened to withhold humanitarian assistance in combatting the AIDS epidemic that was 
ravaging the Soviet Union.1 Ultimately the Soviet Union issued statements that refuted the 
allegation that United States created AIDS.2  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, active measures slowly became a Cold War 
relic, and many in the scholarly world and decision-making circles no longer perceived 
active measures as a serious threat. As the cooperation between Russia and the United 
States deteriorated, Moscow, now with less ability to influence outright—especially in its 
post-Soviet space—revived active measures as a tool of malevolent influence, but with 
21st-century technological advances. This thesis begins with the argument that to counter 
this revived threat, the United States should look to the past to find viable solutions to 
reduce the impact of Russia’s active measures.  
                                                 
1 Charles Z. Wick and United States Information Agency, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of 
Glasnost: A Report to Congress by the United States Information Agency (Washington, DC: United States 
Information Agency, 1988), 10; Fletcher Schoen and Christopher Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and 
Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference,” Institute for National 
Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, no. 11 (June 2012): 6. 
2 Wick and United States Information Agency, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost, 10. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates past Soviet active measures, the countermeasures employed 
to combat Soviet active measures, and recent Russian active measures to find an answer to 
the question: How can the United States counter Russia’s active measures?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the use of cyber operations and the Internet to promulgate its active measures 
campaigns, Russia has been able to affect more people than anyone could have conceived 
during the Cold War. This direct access to most of the world’s population has dramatically 
increased the threat of active measures, and every government is at risk. Furthermore, the 
interconnected digital world makes it much harder for governments to counter such tactics 
because of the vast operating environment; identifying those engaged on behalf of the 
Russian government has become much more difficult than it was during the pre-digital 
days of the Cold War. Russia’s active measures use the basic principles of democracy to 
attack democratic governments from within and aim to create disunity among nations and 
alliances.  
To protect free democratic societies throughout the world, one must first understand 
Russia’s tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized in pursuit of its active measures 
campaigns. Once a baseline is established, governments can create and implement policies 
to diminish the impact of Russia’s active measures. If governments do nothing or introduce 
haphazard strategies to counter this threat, then Russia’s active measures could have long-
lasting and devastating consequences for democratic governments and alliances 
worldwide. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The legitimacy and origins of the Russian threat are of great concern for 
policymakers of many countries in Europe and the United States. This literature review 
examines the validity of this threat and the different theories about how this threat 
proliferated to its current heightened level, which has contributed to the resurgence of 
Russia’s use of active measures.  
3 
1. Validity of the Threat 
Scholars have suggested that empirical evidence did not support a serious Russian 
military threat against the West. Kofman indicates policymakers exaggerated the Russian 
military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and cautioned that a 
response strategy of permanently posting an increased number of troops in countries along 
Russia’s western border could create a security dilemma that might ultimately lead to a 
self-fulfilled prophecy of increased Russian military threat against NATO.3 Furthermore, 
he specifies NATO’s deterrence was still an effective tool against Russian military action 
as the balance of power remained in NATO’s favor due to that organization’s air and sea 
superiority and the ability to rapidly generate mobilized military power.4 He argues that 
the Russian military did not aim its preparations at NATO; instead, it aligned its military 
to prepare for a war against Ukraine or a potential revolution in Belarus.5 Overall, the 
Russian military threat against NATO was hyperbole.  
This sentiment for the lack of a serious Russian military threat against NATO is 
also supported by Rojansky, who opines that it was “possible that Russia’s non-kinetic 
interventions in the Baltic States, and the bombastic statements of some Russian officials 
and politicians, are about sending messages for a wider post-Soviet audience.”6 
Furthermore, he argues it was to set a red line against the West and to indirectly threaten 
post-Soviet states, “especially Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia,” about 
implementing any pro-Western reforms or revolutions.7 Based on NATO and Russian 
military capabilities and maneuvering, Russian scholar Khramchikin indicates both the 
                                                 
3 Michael Kofman, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 





6 U.S. Policy Toward the Baltic States: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 
Emerging Threats, House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2017), (statement of Matthew Rojansky, 
Director, Kennan Institute Woodrow Wilson Center), 3- 4, ProQuest. 
7 Rojansky, 12. 
4 
Russian and the Western governments’ projections of a military threat was propaganda to 
generate unsupported anti-Russian or anti-NATO hysteria.8  
On the other side of the coin, some authors and strategists feel Russia has the 
capability and desire to directly threaten and degrade the effectiveness of NATO. Such 
scholars as Colby and Solomon provide examples of Russian military capabilities and 
conclude Russia might not be able to sustain a long-term conflict with NATO, but it had 
built the capability and the strategy to win a short-term war to seize NATO territory on the 
Russian western periphery.9 Furthermore, the Kremlin could seize an opportunity to 
control territory that includes the Baltic States, which it saw as part of its sphere of 
influence.10 A 2016 RAND study, for which the authors conducted almost a year’s worth 
of wargaming scenarios, also emphasize this Russian capability.11  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was not interested in its integration 
into the global world as was the West’s policy intended.12 Instead, as Bernstein and Ball 
argued, “the Putin regime saw ‘integration’ as defined by the West as fundamentally 
incompatible with its chosen form of governance”13 and “Putin sees the rules defining the 
international system as a threat not only to Russian interests but to his regime’s very 
survival.”14 As a result, over many years, Russia has developed doctrine and the capability 
to challenge the global order, which includes not only military capabilities but also soft 
power and nuclear saber-rattling “to paralyze alliance decision making.”15 They 
                                                 
8 Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military 
Balance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/
2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346. 
9 Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in 
Europe,” Survival 57, no. 6 (November 2, 2015): 21–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116146. 
10 Colby and Solomon, 24–28. 
11 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19w71fs. 
12 Paul Bernstein and Deborah Ball, “Putin’s Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy” (workshop report, 
National Defense University, 2015), 19–20, http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/Documents/conference-reports/
Putins-Russia-and-US-Defense-Strategy.pdf. 
13 Bernstein and Ball 2. 
14 Bernstein and Ball. 
15 Bernstein and Ball, 4. 
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underscore the Russian threat as real, and the NATO alliance must carefully develop a new 
strategy to deter this threat.16  
Whether warranted or not, both the White House and the Kremlin perceived the 
other as the primary threat to security. A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report detailed 
that the Russian Security Strategy, released in 2015, identified “the United States and its 
NATO allies as Russia’s main threat and accuse[d] the West of pursuing a deliberate policy 
of containment.”17 Additionally, it specified that NATO’s positioning of its military 
capabilities near Russia’s borders was “a serious threat to Russian security.”18 
Furthermore, it detailed the United States’ desire to spread democracy worldwide was a 
scheme to create regime change in governments that did not have the same values as the 
United States.19 As a result of the Kremlin’s view on the increased threat, Alexander 
Velez-Green argued “a rising number of Russia’s senior military strategists are advocating 
for the adoption of a doctrine of pre-emption for the defense of their nation.”20 This pre-
emptive defense strategy would consist of striking NATO and the United States first in the 
event of the perception that Russian strategic security interests were at risk.21 Not only did 
the Kremlin view the global order as a contested sphere but the White House also indicated 
this vulnerability in its 2017 National Security Strategy when, in multiple instances, it 
specifically mentioned Russia as a direct threat to U.S. interests and the regional balance 
of powers.22  
                                                 
16 Bernstein and Ball, 
17 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power—Building a Military to Support Great Power 
Aspirations, DIA-11-1704-161 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 15, 
http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
Russia%20Military%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf. 
18 Defense Intelligence Agency. 
19 Defense Intelligence Agency. 
20 Alexander Velez-Green, The Unsettling View from Moscow (Washington, DC: Center for a New 
American Security, April 27, 2017), 1, ProQuest. 
21 Velez-Green. 
22 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
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2. The Cold War Never Ended 
After examining Russia’s national strategic documents, Pynnöniemi concludes that 
Russia always intended to pursue “its national interests in the military sphere through the 
protection of independence, sovereignty, state, and territorial integrity of Russia and its 
allies against military aggression.”23 It was not until recently, however, that “Russia had 
both the resources and the political will to protect its national security with the means of 
military force.”24 Kier Giles echoes this argument and cited Russia’s response to Syria and 
Ukraine as examples of its confidence in its power to protect its national interests.25  
Similarly, Papava concludes that the renewed Russian aggression was not a new 
phenomenon and instead was a continuation of the suspended Cold War from when the 
Soviet Union collapsed.26 Once Russia’s economy stabilized and recovered, Moscow 
began to push back against the West and officially unsuspended the Cold War in 2008 with 
the invasion of Georgia.27 Feffer also insists the Cold War never really ended, but he 
argues the United States was to blame for keeping it on life support because Washington 
never gave up or disbanded its Cold War institutions nor did it give up its global 
ambitions.28 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America’s delusion that it won the 
Cold War led U.S. policymakers to implement policies and make demands that disregarded 
Russian sovereignty and deepened Russia’s mistrust of what it saw as American 
imperialism.29 Cohen provides a litany of examples: American withdrawal from the Anti-
                                                 
23 Katri Pynnöniemi, “Russia’s National Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution,” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 255, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13518046.2018.1451091. 
24 Pynnöniemi, 255. 
25 Keir Giles, The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy, Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), xiii-xvii, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
pdffiles/PUB1354.pdf. 
26 Vladimer Papava, “Is the New Cold War a Continuation of the Old?,” CICERO Foundation Great 
Debate Paper no. 14/07 (October 2014): 4–6. 
27 Papava, 4–6. 
28 John Feffer, “The Cold War Never Ended,” Foreign Policy in Focus (September 10, 2014), 
http://fpif.org/cold-war-never-ended/. 
29 Stephen Cohen, “The New American Cold War,” The Nation (July 10, 2006): 18–35. 
7 
Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of weapons designed to nullify other nations’ 
nuclear deterrence; support of the many different color-revolutions, demands on how the 
Russian government should govern; and hypocritical criticism of Russian foreign policy 
with regard to its support of neighboring states and its efforts to establish military alliances, 
among others.30  
Not all scholars have associated the increased tension between the West and Russia 
as a continuation of the Cold War and have highlighted the differences between the current 
situation from that of the Cold War. A critical difference, Engle argues, was that the conflict 
was not “an absolute conflict between radically opposite economic systems” and they “are 
not expressions of antithetical ideologies.”31 In the same vein, Rojansky and Salzman cite 
the open dialogue and interpersonal relations between Russia and the West, not just in 
geopolitics but between citizens, was also a distinct difference.32 Furthermore, they note 
that the conflicts did not include all the major world powers taking sides and instead many 
regional power states remained neutral—unlike during the Cold War. They do caution that 
continued tension and resistance to cooperation could create a more hostile atmosphere like 
that of the Cold War.33 
3. NATO Enlargement Created Tension 
NATO enlargement was of great debate during this time and was what some 
scholars thought would lead to the increased hostilities of today. Upon reviewing the 
literature in the 1990s, there appeared to be two principal sides to this debate: one held that 
Russia was still an adversary to the West and expanding NATO would contain and limit 
                                                 
30 Cohen, 23–24. 
31 Eric Engle, “A New Cold War-Cold Peace Russia, Ukraine, and NATO,” Saint Louis University 
Law Journal 59, no. 1 (2014): 173. 
32 Matthew Rojansky and Rachel Salzman, “Debunked: Why There Won’t Be Another Cold War,” 
Perspectives on Peace & Security (March 2015), https://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/debunked-
wont-another-cold-war/. 
33 Rojansky and Salzman. 
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Russia’s future ability to exert its influence when it renounced democratic reform.34 The 
other argument was that NATO should avoid enlargement as it would reduce Russia’s 
cooperation to democratic reform and instead bolster tension between Russia and the 
West.35 Ron Asmus, who ultimately came to favor NATO enlargement as a way to provide 
long-term security and stability, provides a detailed examination of this debate and explains 
that the Clinton administration intended to gradually expand NATO in a way so it was 
redefined and strengthened as well as to consolidate democracy throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe without alienating Russia.36  
Even after the first rounds of NATO enlargement, the debate continued. 
Mearsheimer argues NATO expansion should have ceased and U.S. support for the 
accession of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was a huge mistake.37 Moreover, Russia’s 
responses to both Georgia and Ukraine was understandable if observed from Putin’s 
geopolitical point of view.38 Mearsheimer also attributes the expansion of the European 
Union and the United States’ efforts to democratize Ukraine as predominant factors for 
Russia’s aggressive actions.39 Furthermore, Toal indicates the Bucharest Declaration of 
April 2008, wherein NATO affirmed future accession of Georgia and Ukraine, was a 
contributing factor to the decline of cooperative relations between Russia and the United 
States.40 Authors also argue that Russian hostility toward the West is defendable because 
during the 1990s the West informally promised Russia that NATO would not expand 
                                                 
34 William E. Odom, “NATO’s Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong,” The National Interest, 1995; 
Lars S. Skalnes, “From the Outside in, from the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations 
Theory,” Security Studies 7, no. 4 (June 1, 1998): 45–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429358. 
35 Michael E. Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,” Survival 37, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 
41, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442775; Arms Control, “Opposition to NATO Expansion,” June 
25, 1997, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/221. 
36 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
37 John J. Mearsheimer, “Getting Ukraine Wrong,” New York Times, International edition, March 14, 
2014, 2, ProQuest. 
38 Mearsheimer, 2. 
39 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (October 2014): 77–89. 
40 Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7 and 125. 
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eastward past Germany.41 Others counter this argument on the basis that there was no 
written or formal policy prohibiting or limiting NATO expansion and because the Russian 
government knew the West’s intention was to provide opportunities for gradual NATO 
enlargement.42  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In the 1980s, the United States made concerted efforts to counter the Soviet active 
measures threat, which increasingly made it politically costly for the Soviets to utilize these 
techniques as a form of strategic influence. Through these efforts, the U.S. government 
created an interagency working group called the Active Measures Working Group 
(AMWG); its mission was to collect and disseminate information on Soviet active 
measures in an effort to educate the public and governments abroad on Soviet active 
measures. The primary goal of the U.S. efforts was to increase awareness and highlight the 
potential impact of the Soviet active measures, in turn, reducing the ability for the Soviets 
to manipulate the public.  
This thesis hypothesizes that Russia’s active measures consist of the same 
fundamental techniques that the Soviets used during the Cold War that are only modified 
for use in the 21st century. Russia has increased its active measures’ audience by taking 
advantage of technological developments such as social media and the Internet. This thesis 
also theorizes governments can limit the impact of Russia’s active measures by 
modernizing the techniques the U.S. government used during the Cold War to counter the 
Soviets’ active measures. Limiting the influence of Russia’s active measures will rely on 
rapid identification and extensive public dissemination of information concerning Russia’s 
actions to influence public opinion or increase societal divisions. 
                                                 
41 Joshua Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO 
Expansion,” International Security 40, no. 4 (2016): 40–41, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00236; 
Gordon Hahn, “Broken Promise: NATO Expansion and the End of the Cold War,” Strategic Culture On-
Line Journal, January 9, 2018, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/01/09/broken-promise-nato-
expansion-and-end-cold-war.html. 
42 Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia,” The Washington 
Quarterly 32, no. 2 (March 12, 2009): 39–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600902773248; Hannes 
Adomeit, “NATO’s Eastward Enlargement What Western Leaders Said” (working paper, Federal Academy 
for Security Policy, 2018), https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2018_03.pdf. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis compares the techniques the Soviets used during the Cold War to the 
current Russian active measures to determine if the countermeasures used during the Cold 
War would limit the Russian influences of active measures. Furthermore, it makes 
recommendations on ways in which the United States can better protect Americans against 
Russian active measures that use 21st-century technology to gain greater access to much 
of the population.  
I examined relevant publications to define the complicated term of “active 
measures” and reviewed other Western terms associated with strategic influence, such as 
“public diplomacy.” For information about the Soviets’ use of active measures, I examined 
books, articles, and government reports published during the Cold War and shortly after 
that examine Soviet active measures techniques. Specifically, I studied these works to 
obtain examples of how the Soviets utilized active measures operations as well as how the 
United States countered these operations. For the Russian active measures, I focused the 
research to categorize the different Russian active measures techniques and provided 
examples to form a complete picture of Russia’s use of active measures relating to 
information operations (IO). 
Ultimately, I sought to compare Russian and Soviet active measures to determine 
similarities and differences. Based on this research, I analyzed whether countermeasures 
implemented against the Soviet Union could be utilized against Russia or if there would be 
significant gaps that would need to be addressed.  
I limited the research for this thesis to open-source information, available in books, 
scholarly journals, newspaper and magazine articles, and de-classified government 
hearings. I do not include any classified or restricted information, but this limitation should 
not detract from the analysis as there has been a surge in research since 2016. Scholars 
have associated active measures with assassinations, commonly referred to as “wet 
operations,” as well as with terrorist-inspired proxy wars, but I did not focus on those types 
of operations. Instead, I focused on the analysis of the IO aspects of active measures. Due 
to the nature of active measures and the disinformation surrounding these types of 
11 
campaigns, I took care to examine the credibility of a source to minimize the mistake of 
representing disinformation as fact in this thesis. 
Even though scholars have traced the Soviets’ use of active measures dating back 
to the Bolshevik Revolution, which arguably formed the heyday of this tactic, this thesis is 
focused on the Cold War. Unless required for analytical clarity or to provide examples of 
different themes categories, I limited the examples for each identified technique because it 
would not be feasible or beneficial to examine several examples of the same method. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 
II describes what scholars have defined as “active measures” and other terms associated 
with influence techniques and accepted means of soft power. Chapter III explores the 
numerous methods in which the Soviet Union utilized active measures during the Cold 
War, examples of these techniques, and the measures the United States took to counter the 
active measures threat during the Cold War. Chapter IV identifies recent Russian active 
measures utilized against the Western world. Finally, Chapter V explains current U.S. 
countermeasures and provides policy recommendations on countering the present Russian 
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II. ACTIVE MEASURES DEFINED 
Some early forms of political or strategic influence were Queen Elizabeth I’s use 
of the London theaters to implant ideas through plays43 and Napoleon’s use of 
revolutionary ideas against the Monarchs to generate support for his military conquests 
throughout Europe.44 Over time, states with competing interests have weaponized and 
increasingly used influence to further national interests. This development gained attention 
in the political and scholarly world predominantly because of the Cold War, when the two 
great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—polarized the world into two 
distinct ideological camps. As a result, much terminology arose to describe different forms 
of strategic influence. One such term was “active measures.”  
When decision makers refer to strategic influence, they frequently mix 
terminology, muddling the analysis of active measures. Because of the many like terms to 
describe the different forms of strategic influence, confusion exists as to what types of 
influence belong to each category. The confusion of terms can lead to not clearly 
identifying the active measures threat, in turn, constricting decision makers’ abilities to 
implement plausible countermeasures. To better communicate and focus the examination 
of active measures, one must first define the terms that people sometimes mistakenly use 
to describe the Soviets’ and now Russia’s unique way of influence and the actual term 
itself. Therefore, this chapter focuses on establishing a fundamental understanding of active 
measures through identifying similar Western terms and comparing the Cold War 
definition of active measures with its more contemporary meaning. These definitions help 
establish the base knowledge to aid in the comparison of active measures used during the 
Cold War to active measures used in the recent past.  
                                                 
43 Paul A. Smith, On Political War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press Publications, 
1989), 54–63. 
44 Smith, 93. 
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A. WESTERN TERMINOLOGY 
Many people misuse Western terms to describe active measures. These terms 
include “propaganda”—an essential component of active measures—as well as 
“disinformation,” “misinformation,” and the broad category of “political warfare,” 
encompassing “public diplomacy” and “information operations” or “IO.” Confusion as to 
terms of strategic influence can muddle the collective analysis and result in a 
miscalculation of the threat from active measures.  
1. Propaganda 
Jowett and O’Donnell define “propaganda” as “the deliberate, systematic attempt 
to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”45 A propagandist can use any 
communication platform as a means to deliver propaganda.46 Examples include false 
stories or fabricated data promulgated through print, videos, speeches, radio broadcasts, 
music, and the many different communication venues on the Internet, such as social media, 
blog posts, or websites.  
Jowett and O’Donnell assert that propaganda received its negative connotations 
after World War I, when people realized their governments were not only using propaganda 
overseas to influence the enemy but also to sustain the war effort on the home front.47 
Through exaggerations of atrocities in the form of hate propaganda, the states used 
propaganda to stoke the flame of anger against the enemy and were highly successful. Once 
the public learned about the lies, they saw propaganda in a negative light.48 Thus, today, 
government officials no longer refer to the government’s use of information to influence 
as “propaganda”; instead, Jowett and O’Donnell referred to it in such terms as 
                                                 
45 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, 2015), 7. 
46 Jowett and O’Donnell, 233. 
47 Jowett and O’Donnell, 246–48. 
48 Jowett and O’Donnell. 
15 
“communication, information, and persuasion because they imply no value judgment.”49 
Typically, governments reserve the terms associated with propaganda to describe an 
adversary’s use of information as an influence tool.50 Still, scholars have acknowledged 
that most countries, including Western nations, utilize different variations of propaganda 
as tools of influence in the pursuit of their national interests.51  
2. Disinformation and Misinformation  
Two other terms directly associated with propaganda are “disinformation” and 
“misinformation,” which are fundamental to active measures operations. Many define 
“misinformation” and “disinformation” interchangeably, but they, in fact, have two 
separate meanings. As Fallis illustrates, over the years many scholars have rendered their 
interpretation of what disinformation means.52 For simplicity, however, this thesis uses 
Fetzer’s definition of disinformation as “the distribution, assertion, or dissemination of 
false, mistaken, or misleading information in an intentional, deliberate, or purposeful effort 
to mislead, deceive, or confuse.”53 Fact-based disinformation typically works best as the 
facts help legitimize the message. With respect to active measures, it appears propagandists 
contrive disinformation to weaken an adversary, perhaps by painting a country as 
inherently racist or as warmongers.54 
                                                 
49 Jowett and O’Donnell, 55. 
50 Ladislav Bittman, “The Use of Disinformation by Democracies,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 4, no. 2 (January 1, 1990): 249, https://doi.org/10.1080/
08850609008435142. 
51 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 105–178. 
52 Don Fallis, “What Is Disinformation?,” Library Trends 63, no. 3 (2015): 401–26, https://doi.org/
10.1353/lib.2015.0014. 
53 James H. Fetzer, “Disinformation: The Use of False Information,” Minds and Machines 14, no. 2 
(May 1, 2004): 231, https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000021683.28604.5b. 
54 Shultz and Godson detail a primary active measures theme was to portray the United States as a 
warmonger. For more information see: Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active 
Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 149–57; Examples of 
propagandists portraying the United States as racist include the disinformation campaign that the U.S. 
government assisted in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. For more information, see: Christopher 
M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History 
of the KGB, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 238. 
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An essential distinction between “disinformation” and “misinformation” is the 
element of intent. “Misinformation,” according to Bittman, is when a person “as a result of 
a mistake, omission, prejudice or sheer ignorance”55 disseminates erroneous or false 
information. On the other hand, the goal of disinformation is to make people believe in the 
falsities of the information to the point that people doubt the truth or accept the 
disinformation as fact. As a result, people naively disseminate the disinformation that then 
becomes misinformation, and as it spreads, it gains legitimacy. A common example is a 
typical email hoax that people forward not realizing it is a trick. Once a person forwards 
the email without an intent to deceive, the email becomes misinformation.  
Western democratic governments are less likely to utilize disinformation because 
of voter accountability and the principles of liberalism but will occasionally resort to using 
disinformation to further national objectives. Bittman argues that democratic governments, 
particularly the U.S. government, use different terms, such as “strategic deception,” to 
mask its use of disinformation.56 Furthermore, he identifies two publicly exposed 
operations: the Iran-Contra Affair and the 1986 “anti-Libyan disinformation 
misfortune,”57 wherein the U.S. government utilized disinformation to further its national 
objectives. Moreover, not only did the U.S. government attempt to deceive foreign 
adversaries, but the disinformation campaigns also misled the American public and 
government officials.58 Another example of a democratic government utilizing 
disinformation was France’s use of it in 1993 during the Rwandan Civil War to frame the 
fighting as new and a Ugandan invasion as more than a civil war, which allowed the French 
to justify increased involvement.59 Despite these examples, there is a lower propensity for 
Western democratic governments to utilize disinformation as a tool of influence due to the 
                                                 
55 Bittman, “The Use of Disinformation by Democracies,” 284. 
56 Bittman, 251. 
57 Bittman, 253. 
58 Bittman, 253–56. 
59 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), 176. 
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stigma of propaganda and the overall disapproval of the use of disinformation as a means 
of influence.  
3. Political Warfare 
Political warfare encompasses many different categories of state influence. One of 
the first persons to acknowledge the many aspects of state influence was Clausewitz when 
he famously wrote, “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a 
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”60 When Clausewitz 
defined war, he specifically referred to “act[s] of violence.”61 In 1948 as a response to the 
increasing Soviet influence on the world, George Kennan, utilizing the Clausewitz 
definition of war, defined political warfare as “the employment of all the means at a 
nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives”62 to include “operations 
[that] are both overt and covert.”63 Kennan’s words laid the foundation for what the 
western world came to define as “political warfare.”64 
A 2018 RAND study describes the historical evolution of the term and synthesized 
a more contemporary definition as “a deliberate policy choice to undermine a rival or 
achieve other explicitly political objectives by means other than routine diplomacy or all-
out war.”65 This definition underscores the importance of a state’s intent; therefore, states 
cannot inadvertently conduct political warfare. Additionally, the definition excludes 
normal relations that do not seek to undermine a state’s policy or its decision makers.  
                                                 
60 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 87. 
61 Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, 90. 
62 “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” U.S. Department of State, May 4, 1948, para. 1, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269. 
63 U.S. Department of State. 
64 Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html. 
65 Robinson et al. 
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4. Public Diplomacy 
All nations practice some form of public diplomacy as a basic means of strategic 
influence. A wide range of views exists on the precise definition of public diplomacy. As 
outlined in The Public Diplomacy Reader, some people do not associate national 
broadcasting, such as Radio Free Europe (RFE), with public diplomacy, while others see 
all methods of state communication with a foreign public as a form of public diplomacy.66 
The difference depends on the person, and some of those who work in international public 
broadcasting see themselves as unbiased journalists rather than mouthpieces of public 
diplomacy.67 Still, the idea behind public diplomacy is to enhance a country’s image or 
explain a nation’s policies to a foreign public. In most regards, states fund national 
broadcasting agencies and maintain direct control or manage them through an umbrella 
organization, such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors—of which all nine board 
members, to include the U.S. Secretary of State, are Senate-confirmed presidential 
appointees.68 Therefore, regardless of the latitude the national broadcasting agencies have 
to independently operate, it seems implausible to consider that the state does not maintain 
some say over the content of the broadcasting.  
According to Nye, the desired outcome of public diplomacy was for a state to 
maintain or develop an attractive image to improve the chance of achieving the desired 
results as they relate to national objectives.69 Nye specifies three dimensions to public 
diplomacy: 1) daily communication with the foreign public to explain policy decisions, 2) 
a strategic-communications plan based on long-term themes related to national objectives, 
and 3) the development and cultivation of personal relationships with key personnel and a 
nation’s citizens.70 Some of the wide-ranging tools used in public diplomacy include 
                                                 
66 Michael J. Waller, The Public Diplomacy Reader (Washington, DC: The Institute of World Politics 
Press, 2009), 23. 
67 Waller, 23. 
68 “Our Leadership,” Broadcasting Board of Governors, April 26, 2018, https://www.bbg.gov/who-
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69 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004), 110. 
70 Nye, 108–11. 
19 
public broadcasting, official press releases, cultural exchanges, foreign aid/humanitarian 
assistance, economic initiatives, engagement through social media, and support of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) that represent the ideals of a nation. Public diplomacy 
does not include normal diplomatic relations or public affairs activities typically designed 
to inform domestic audiences.71 States should aim to use public diplomacy to generate 
what Nye describes as “soft-power,” which is influence through “attraction rather than 
coercion or payment.”72 Essentially, public diplomacy, if executed correctly, allows a 
nation to generate enough positive influence that the foreign public acts in the interests of 
the outside state.  
The key difference between public diplomacy and active measures lies in the 
positive influence aspect. Unlike public diplomacy, active measures are based on 
manipulative influence and are not concentrated on building a nation’s own positive 
influence. Instead, active measures focus on tarnishing another nation’s image, typically 
by some form of disinformation or manipulation that Russia uses to advance its own 
nation’s influence around the world.  
5. Information Operations 
Another term popular in the United States and frequently used to describe active 
measures is “information operations” or “IO.” IO is primarily a U.S. military term and 
entails an extensive array of capabilities focused on the use of information to influence and 
include any offensive or defensive acts related to communication systems that are not 
limited to but routinely focused on the cyber domain. According to DOD’s Joint 
Publication 3–13, DOD IO is defined as “the integrated employment, during military 
operations, of [information-related capabilities] IRCs in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and 
potential adversaries while protecting our own.”73 The publication does not limit the 
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72 Nye, Soft Power, x. 
73 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, JP 3–13 (Washington, DC: Department 
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timeline of military operations to combat operations; instead, it includes any DOD--
supported operation.74 The influence components of IO are similar to active measures, but 
one should not confuse IO with active measures because active measures do not include 
the many different IRCs that IO includes. 
The mistake of referring to active measures as IO often occurs because IO 
capabilities include the utilization of military information support operations (MISO)—
formerly referred to as psychological operations (PSYOPS)—and military deception as 
tools of influence, which closely resemble the techniques of active measures. The DOD 
publication defines “MISO” as “planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals.”75 Additionally, it defines “military deception” as “actions executed to 
deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to 
the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”76 According to the definitions of propaganda 
and disinformation, the DOD uses “MISO” to deliver propaganda and “military deception 
to disseminate disinformation.” Principally, these two capabilities of IO are what make up 
the foundation for active measures, which explains the frequent confusion of the two terms.  
B. DEFINING ACTIVE MEASURES 
In their article, “Active Measures: Russia’s Key Export,” Jolanta Darczewska and 
Piotr Zochowski provide varying definitions of the term and thereby illustrate the 
complexity of its meaning.77 Within their article, they provide the Komitet 
gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (KGB, or Committee for State Security) definition of the 
term as listed in the 1972 KGB-issued Dictionary of Counterintelligence as: 
acts of counterintelligence making it possible to penetrate the intentions of 
the enemy, allowing his unwanted steps to be anticipated, to lead the enemy 
                                                 
74 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
75 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-9-II-10. 
76 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-10. 
77 Jolanta Darczewska and Piotr Zochowski, “Active Measures Russia’s Key Export,” Point of View, 
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into error, to take the initiative from him, to thwart his actions of sabotage. 
Active measures … are offensive in nature, allowing the detection and 
prevention of hostile activities in their early stages, forcing the opponent to 
expose himself, imposing the will to act on him, forcing him to act in 
adverse conditions and in ways desired by the counterintelligence services. 
In practice, active measures … include projects aimed at building up the 
position of spies in the camp of the enemy and its surroundings, conducting 
operational games with the enemy, disinformation directed at him, 
compromise and demoralisation, the transfer onto the territory of the USSR 
of persons of special operational value, obtaining intelligence 
information, etc.78 
This definition contradicts the actual usage of the term as the Soviets, and more 
recently the Russians, have used it as a capability of influence more than as a mechanism of 
counterintelligence. This confusion exists because the KGB’s intelligence and 
counterintelligence handbooks, issued to KGB officials during the 1970s, had two definitions 
for the term, one for counterintelligence (meropriyatiya aktivnyye) and the other for offensive 
intelligence (aktivnyye meropriyatiya).79 Vasily Mitrokhin, former Soviet archivist and 
defector, smuggled and translated copies of the handbooks, which provide the following 
KGB intelligence definition for active measures (also aktivnyye meropriyatiya) as: 
agent-operational measures aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of 
the political life of a target country which are of interest, its foreign policy, 
the solution of international problems, misleading the adversary, 
undermining and weakening his positions, the disruption of his hostile 
plans, and the achievement of other aims.80  
Mitrokhin’s copy of the KGB handbooks provides a similar definition to the one 
Darczewska and Zochowski provide, and it was specific to counterintelligence. These two 
definitions were not the only ones in the KGB’s handbook that related to active measures. 
There was also a definition for “active measures by KGB external intelligence” (aktivnyee 
meropriyatiya vneshney razvedki KGB),81 which the handbook defined as 
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agent-operational measures directed at exerting influence on the foreign 
policy and the internal political situation of target countries foreign policy 
and the internal political situation of target countries in the interests of the 
Soviet Union and of other countries of the socialist community, the World 
Communist and National Liberation Movement, weakening the political, 
military economic and ideological positions of capitalism, undermining its 
aggressive plans, in order to create conditions favourable to the successful 
implementation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, and ensuring peace 
and social progress.82 
The multiple definitions in the KGB intelligence and counterintelligence 
dictionaries alone demonstrate the complexity of the term, but over the years as scholars 
and public officials have attempted to grasp the totality of active measures, they continue 
to add to the lexicon. In her master’s thesis, Stephanie Whittle provided a compilation of 
seven authors’ definitions of active measures.83 She contributes to the list by synthesizing 
her own interpretation of active measures, which was a “protracted whole-of-government 
approach to undermine, isolate, and incapacitate an adversary through influencing and 
mobilizing relevant populations in order to prepare the environment for decisive military 
action.”84 The discrepancy in her definition is that active measures are not necessarily a 
precursor to military action.  
Out of all the definitions, the most concise is from the U.S. Department of State 
(DoS). In 1989, the DoS defined active measures as “covert or deceptive operations 
conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy” with the “goal to influence opinions or 
actions of individuals, governments or publics.” Furthermore, the DoS specified that the 
methods of employing active measures included “disinformation and forgeries,” “front 
groups and friendship societies,” “nonruling communist and leftist parties,” and “political 
influence operations.”85  
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While the DoS definition is simple and easy to understand, it omits the overt 
methods of active measures. As Schultz and Godson note, the overt aspect of active 
measures can include influence delivered through the state media, cultural programs, and 
diplomatic means.86 It is important to note that many, including Schultz and Godson,87 
add paramilitary operations to the active measures toolkit and authors such as Richelson88 
include assassinations as a form of active measures. Essentially, scholars who studied 
active measures during the Cold War focused on the weaponization of information as an 
influence mechanism. 
Since the 1980s, the definition of Soviet influence activities has changed little; 
however, they have assumed another name. A July 2018 Department of Justice (DoJ) report 
labelled the activities previously associated with active measures as “malign foreign 
influence operations” and defined them as “covert actions by foreign governments intended 
to sow division in our society, undermine confidence in our democratic institutions, and 
otherwise affect political sentiment and public discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical 
discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives.”89 Additionally, a 2018 Minority 
Staff Report for the Committee on Foreign Relations also refers to Russian influence 
operations as “malign foreign influence” but indicates active measures were the genesis for 
current Russian efforts to subvert or influence other nations.90 The Minority Staff Report’s 
description of malign foreign influence is similar to the Cold War definitions of Soviet 
active measures, but specifically included in the Committee’s description is Russia’s use 
of economic controls mixed with the use of criminal organizations as influence tools.91  
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Russia’s use of criminal organizations and corruption is significant because, as its 
economic influence spreads throughout a target country, it enables Moscow to purchase 
political influence.92 With the use of economic influence and traditional active measures 
techniques, Russia can cement its power within a state. The Kremlin Playbook emphasized 
that once Russia controlled over 12 percent of a nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), 
Russia had a higher chance of influencing the nation’s policies.93 This economic influence 
was prevalent during the Cold War, but the Soviet primarily used it against Third World 
countries. In 1983, Guan-Fu noted that, dating back to 1956, trade and foreign aid was a 
main Soviet strategy of influence, to the extent that Khrushchev thought a Third World 
country would become socialist if the Soviets controlled 40 percent of its total trade.94 
Even though the Soviets used economic influence during the Cold War, scholars and 
intelligence officials did not typically include economic influence as part of Soviet active 
measures.  
The principal differences between the Cold War and the present were not the overall 
objectives of active measures or even necessarily the fundamental techniques. Instead, the 
differences revolved around the delivery methods, such as the use of cyber platforms and 
the utilization of cyber hacking as ways in which operatives accessed information used to 
influence. The DoJ report highlights the use of cyber operations as the primary delivery 
method for the Russians in using active measures techniques as a means of influence, which 
was not an option during the Cold War.95 Except for the inclusion of economic influence, 
there are limited differences between the common Cold War definition of active measures 
and the current description of malign foreign influence.  
The underlying objectives for active measures was to plant ideas in either a single 
mind (influential political figure) or in the minds of a group of individuals (communities, 
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political groups, minority groups, and various others) to create disunity that leads to 
potential subversion, conflict, or the undermining of public trust, or influence an action that 
politically benefits Soviet or Russian national interests. After the operatives plant the idea, 
they must cultivate and reinforce it through a variety of means. The embedding and the 
cultivation process can include overt, covert, or semi-covert means, or a combination 
thereof. During a Senate Committee Hearing in 1985, Thomas Thorne, Jr., the deputy 
assistant secretary for Coordination, Intelligence, and Research for the DoS, testified that 
the U.S. intelligence community designated active measures techniques into three different 
types of operations: black, gray, and white.96 Black operations were those not attributable 
or falsely attributable to a government and were highly covert.97 Most black operations 
allow for plausible deniability. Thorne testified that white operations were those directly 
attributed to a country and would usually be in the form of a governmental response or 
public message indicating its stance on a topic or issue.98 Furthermore, gray operations 
included those operations that a government would not necessarily acknowledge, but for 
which there was a reasonable assumption of government affiliation.99 The black-and-white 
color scale is not unique to active measures and applies to various types of intelligence and/
or military action.  
C. CONCLUSION 
A wide range of Western terms exists that are associated with political influence, 
and this chapter has focused on providing definitions of each of these terms to aid in the 
analysis of Soviet and Russian active measures. Active measures, distinct from Western 
influence terms, rely more on using deceptive techniques as a form of influence. The Soviet 
Union and Russia have used these techniques to wage political war against Western 
nations. This war continues even in times of perceived peace and cooperation. The active 
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measures threat must be seen for what it is, and nations must not confuse terms that disguise 
that threat. To protect a nation’s security, Western leaders must then clearly define active 
measures. Ultimately, this thesis uses the DoS’s 1989 definition of active measures in 
combination with Schultz and Godson’s definition, which includes overt methods.  
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III. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES DURING THE COLD WAR 
This chapter examines the Soviet Union’s use of active measures during the Cold 
War and the United States’ counterefforts. The Soviet Union created a centralized 
apparatus to use active measures as a primary means of influence throughout the world. It 
targeted the West in an attempt to degrade the NATO alliance and deteriorate the fabric of 
Western society, exploit democratic freedoms, and widen societal fissures. The United 
States reduced the influence of active measures by taking an aggressive approach to 
identify, publicize, and confront the Soviet Union to make it politically costly for the Soviet 
Union to use active measures as a form of malevolent influence. The research finds that 
the United States’ aggressive approach reduced the impact of Soviet active measures.  
The chapter starts by explaining the Soviet intelligence apparatus the Soviet Union 
used to implement active measures. Next, it outlines and provides examples of the different 
categories of active measures. The chapter concludes with the historical approach of the 
United States’ efforts to counter Soviet active measures.  
A. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES  
Soviet-era active measures were a primary way in which the Soviet Union 
competed to maintain international influence and further its strategic interests. It developed 
a multi-faceted approach that centered on tarnishing another nation’s image in hopes of 
bettering its own. Soviet-era active measures exploited any topic, even those with little 
evidentiary support. In 1982, the director of the FBI testified that the FBI determined that 
Soviet active measures did not have a significant impact in the United States.100 He 
justified the FBI assessment because of the United States’ high degree of suspicion of 
Soviet influence and Americans were sensitized to the Soviet front group’s’ attempts to 
influence—which was the Soviet Union’s primary access to the American public. 
Furthermore, he indicated the Soviet implementation of active measures was easily 
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detected.101 Even though the assessment specified Americans were not easily influenced 
through Soviet active measures, the amount of time and resources the Soviet invested 
shows they perceived active measures as a significant form of influence. The incentive 
came from the developing world as the Soviet Union had easier access to the population 
and these countries, for the most part, lacked sophisticated media outlets.  
To maintain control over its active measures, the Soviet Union developed a 
centralized apparat consisting of three organizations. These organizations implemented 
active measures using four primary techniques: media disinformation, forgeries, agents of 
influence, and front groups/organizations. The Soviet Union used these active measures 
techniques to influence foes and allies alike right up until the Soviet Union collapsed.  
The first organization to examine within the Soviet active measures apparat is the 
International Department (ID), which, according to Pincher, was “responsible for 
suggesting active measures operations to the Politburo, and when approved, they direct[ed] 
and orchestrate[d] them.”102 The ID was directly responsible for managing front 
organizations, coordinating with the foreign communist parties around the world, 
controlling clandestine radio stations, planting forgeries, and recruiting and/or maintaining 
recruited assets to include agents of influence.103 The Politburo linked the ID to the 
International Information Department (IID), which the Soviet Union created in the late 
1970s to maintain and manage all Soviet foreign media, including newspapers, radio, 
television broadcasting stations, and the published Soviet books.104  
The infamous KGB tactically carried out the covert active measures operations.105 
According to Pincher, prior to 1968, the KGB did not emphasize the use of active measures 
as a weapon against rival countries.106 Instead, he argues the Soviet Union mostly used 
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active measures to slander those who criticized the Soviet government. Furthermore, it was 
not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that the KGB transformed and developed its active 
measures program into an offensive weapon against rival countries.107 Pincher explains 
after World War II and up to the late 1960s, Department D (Disinformation) of the KGB 
conducted active measures operations for the KGB. He indicates that because of minimal 
funding and staffing of Department D, it showed the KGB lacked emphasis for active 
measures during this period. It was not until the Politburo appointed a new director in 1958 
that the Soviet Union began to emphasize the use of the KGB to implement active 
measures.108  
Pincher writes that the new KGB director suggested the KGB should be more than 
just experts in the field of espionage, and he proposed that KGB agents should also be 
proficient using active measures.109 The new director’s vision supported the Marxist 
ideological war against capitalism and that the KGB could use active measures in rival 
countries to spark the rise of communist revolutions in capitalist countries. The Politburo 
approved the director’s plan and let him refocus the KGB to emphasize the use of active 
measures.110 Within 10 years, the department swelled in the number of agents and was 
upgraded from a department to a service, thus increasing its access to resources and 
funds.111 From 1970 onward, the section of the KGB that conducted active measures was 
known as Service A.112 
Active measures quickly became a top priority of the Politburo, and Moscow 
heavily invested into the program. The CIA estimated that in 1980, the Soviet Union spent 
approximately $3 billion annually on its active measures program.113 The KGB was also 
responsible for coordinating with other Soviet Bloc intelligence services and it “introduced 
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a new element of coordination with the satellite services through the creation of 
departments for disinformation in East Germany, Czechoslovak and Hungarian series and 
the establishment of direct lines of communication from these departments to the 
KGB.”114  
The KGB’s 1984 Work Plan illustrates the Politburo’s centralization efforts to 
focus intelligence operations—including active measures. Gordievsky, a former KGB 
colonel, and Andrew provided a translated copy of the Work Plan in their book.115 
Gordievsky and Andrew note that the Politburo directed the creation of the plan and 
supplied it to all KGB residencies to specify the priorities for intelligence operations. This 
document directed KGB agents to “concentrate on developing and carrying out large-scale 
comprehensive operations using the various lines of intelligence in key-sectors.”116 The 
authors note that the key sectors included: countering U.S. and NATO efforts to obtain 
military superiority; destabilizing NATO through emphasizing differences of strategic 
military thinking among NATO members; encouraging the anti-war and anti-missile 
movement; reducing U.S. and capitalist influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 
countering U.S. attempts to curtail foreign investment, trade, and scientific exchange with 
the USSR; destabilizing the relationship between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC); and further distancing the Non-Aligned Movement from 
Westernizing. The plan directed the KGB to develop additional avenues to implement 
active measures and increase coordination between Soviet departments as well as with 
allied nations’ intelligence services.117 Overall, it appeared the strategic goal for active 
measures was to reduce the influence of the West—mainly the United States, or as the 
Soviets termed it, “the Main Adversary”—which within a bipolar world would increase 
Soviet influence.118 The 1984 Work Plan revealed that the Politburo had high expectations 
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for its active measures, and based on the listed priorities it must have had confidence in its 
intelligence services to implement long-term active measures operations.  
Another essential intelligence arm of the Soviet Union was the Glavnoye 
Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Sovetskoy Armii (Main Intelligence Directorate of the 
Soviet Army), commonly referred to in the West as the GRU. The GRU conducted covert 
missions that encompassed a military role such as assassinations, paramilitary support of 
terrorism, and sabotage missions.119 The GRU recruited, trained, and provided covert 
material support for dormant assets that the Soviet Union could activate to undermine its 
adversaries in support of military operations. While the GRU had operatives around the 
world, it played more of a supportive role to the KGB with respect to active measures.120  
In 1978, the IID became the overt propaganda arm for the Soviet Union, replacing 
the Department of Agitation and Propaganda.121 In the early 1980s, according to Schultz 
and Godson, the IID oversaw “two news agencies (Tass and Novosti Press Agency), the 
prestige press (e.g., Pravda), various publications, and approximately 500 Soviet 
journalists stationed in foreign countries.”122 The department’s influence dramatically 
grew between the 1960s and the 1980s as Soviet international radio broadcasts went from 
approximately 1,047 hours to 2,762 hours.123 The IID predominantly carried out the overt 
portions of the Soviet active measures operations. 
B. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES 
The Soviet Union predominantly utilized four active measures techniques: media 
disinformation, forgeries, agents of influence, and front groups/organizations. 
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1. Media Disinformation 
The Soviet Union prioritized the use of propaganda and built a large state-
controlled media apparatus that helped deliver disinformation as a form of active measures. 
The Soviets were able to utilize the many different media outlets of the Soviet Republics 
to disseminate its propaganda for both foreign and domestic audiences. The Soviet Union 
had two primary print news agencies for international dissemination, TASS and Novosti 
(APN). According to a 1986 CIA report, TASS—official news agency of the Communist 
Party—operated in 126 countries and disseminated its material through various news 
outlets in 115 countries but tailored its content toward the Soviet domestic audience.124 
APN, according to the CIA, was the Soviet Union’s unofficial news agency. Its primary 
function was to inform foreign audiences as it delivered content specifically for each 
country where it operated.125 Additionally, the CIA explains that in 1986, APN operated 
in 110 nations with more than 5,000 affiliates and its journalists worked in almost all of 
the Soviet embassies. One benefit to Soviet print media over Western print was it was 
considerably less expensive, which made it more accessible.126  
Soviet active measures through disinformation focused on specific themes 
developed by the Politburo and the ID. Schultz and Godson detail their study of Soviet 
news to determine Soviet external propaganda themes.127 They analyzed a column titled 
International Review in the Soviet newspaper Pravda—which targeted both foreign and 
domestic audiences—and the Soviet newspaper New Times—which targeted foreign 
audiences—from 1960–1980. They identified a consistent theme of “American and NATO 
aggressiveness and militarism,” and the Soviet journalists frequently included negative and 
derogatory terms to describe the West.128  
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Starting in the 1970s, in addition to themes of aggressiveness and militarism, the 
authors explain that the Soviet journalists also included the following themes: the United 
States and NATO were not interested in solving international problems, the United States 
wanted to subvert communist unity, and the West was undergoing multiple crises.129 The 
authors hypothesize that the Soviet Union did not see the West as an actual security threat, 
and instead, only desired to weaken the NATO alliance.130  
The Soviet Union not only used its own media apparatus to implement theme-based 
propaganda and disinformation but it also exploited media outside the Soviet Union, 
notably in the developing world.131 Once an item was published in the developing world, 
the Soviet Union referenced the developing world’s reporting in Soviet media.132 Thus, 
the Soviet Union used the developing world’s press to hide its connection as the original 
reporting source and to increase the information’s credibility as an item from the 
international media.133 In instances when the Soviet Union lacked sources to implant its 
articles in foreign newspapers surreptitiously, the Soviet embassies purchased newspaper 
advertisements to disseminate its political messages.134 
Soviet propagandists, according to the United States Information Agency (USIA), 
scoured different foreign news sources to find material they could twist to fit into a 
particular theme. Additionally, the Soviet Union exploited unwitting sources or “useful 
idiots” into providing fodder for its disinformation campaigns.135 The USIA provides such 
examples as portraying the opinions of individuals or small groups with radical views as 
the majority view.136 The USIA also notes that the Soviet media took legitimate quotes 
out of context to fit a narrative it was trying to exploit, sometimes totally distorting the 
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original intent. Finally, the USIA report concludes that even after Soviet leadership 
promised to stop promulgating disinformation in 1987, measures particularly in and 
through the foreign news continued apace.137  
Soviet active measures sometimes played both sides of an issue if it furthered Soviet 
objectives, which was evident in how it exploited the racial division during the Civil Rights 
Movement. Andrew and Mitrokhin write that while Dr. Martin Luther King was alive, the 
Soviet Union created disinformation campaigns to discredit him in hopes to have a more 
radical leader replace him.138 Dr. King’s methods of advancing civil rights for African 
Americans through peaceful protest did not help the Soviet Union rouse division within 
the United States.139 It appears the Soviet Union’s objective was to promote riots and mass 
violence to tear America down from within and to provide the Soviet Union with 
ammunition to further attack capitalism as an inferior system of governance. After riots 
exploded on the streets of many U.S. cities following the assassination of Dr. King, with 
its active measures campaigns the Soviet Union embraced Dr. King as a martyr and 
disseminated stories that U.S. government officials helped white racists plot his 
assassination.140  
The Soviet Union developed specific methods it used to disseminate disinformation 
as a form of active measures. As it lacked reliable access to Western media, the Soviet 
Union utilized its own extensive media arm and the developing world’s press agencies to 
promulgate its deceitful messages to the world. The Soviet Union developed specific 
disinformation themes as active measures to tarnish its adversaries’ reputation. The Soviet 
Union also used disinformation in an attempt to amplify socially divisive issues to weaken 
an adversary from within. A fundamental understanding of how the Soviet Union used 
disinformation as active measures will provide clarity on how Russia is currently using 
disinformation to weaken its adversaries and further its strategic objectives.  
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2. Forgeries  
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union created and used forgeries to complement 
its active measures campaigns. Forgeries are considered black operations and consist of 
documents that the Soviet Union, or any other government, created that were either 
partially fraudulent, known as alterations, or entirely fabricated, identified as 
fabrications.141 In 1983, the DoS noted that the Soviet-bloc countries that predominantly 
created and distributed forgeries were the Soviet Union, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia.142 Certain characteristics typified Soviet forgeries, in part because these 
hallmarks made the forgeries harder to detect as such. The nine characteristics of a Soviet 
forgery were “(1) use of security classifications, (2) use of official letterheads, (3) surfaced 
as a copy, not an original, (4) key documents were not in sharp focus or full sized, (5) 
accompanied with a cover letter, (6) used logical plots, (7) documents were provided for 
free, (8) designed for media, and (9) aimed at foreign governments or leaders.”143  
Soviet forgeries deployed as active measures followed strategic themes. Schultz 
and Godson found that from 1960–1975, Soviet forgeries focused on painting the United 
States as the main threat to world peace because U.S. officials refused to negotiate with the 
Soviets regarding disarmament. They explain that the forgeries were used to accuse the 
United States of covertly influencing developing countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, so that the United States could become the sole hegemonic power in the 
world.144 The forgeries also concentrated on destabilizing the Western Alliance and the 
relationships between Western countries. Additionally, the forgeries depicted U.S. 
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politicians and military leaders as warmongers who had no regard for European safety and 
that they would sacrifice European countries in the event of a war by launching nuclear 
strikes on European territory to defeat the Soviets.145 
One of the more well-known and sophisticated forgeries was the forgery known as 
Army Field Manual 30–31B, which reappeared more than 20 times from 1967–1982.146 
The intent, according to Barron, was for this forgery to look like a supplement to the real 
U.S. Army Field Manual 30–31.147 The fake supplement contained instructions for U.S. 
military specialists to interfere with a host nation’s domestic politics to ensure that 
countries implemented anti-leftist and anti-communist policies.148 Specifically, Barron 
illustrates the manual instructed the military specialist to promote violence among leftist 
groups to force host nation governments to implement policies or take actions against those 
groups.149 This forgery was often referenced and the Soviet Union was able to plant its 
seed of deception in the minds of millions of people around the world, raising the specter 
of U.S. interference where there was none.150  
The Soviet Union used forgeries to stoke domestic divisions along ethnic lines 
within a country. One such forgery, documented in a 1982 Congressional Hearing, was a 
faked Presidential Review Memorandum/NS46 dated March 17, 1978.151 The forgery 
purported to be a review of U.S. policy with regard to South Africa and the United States’ 
concern of the influence of what was referenced as “black Africa.” The faked memorandum 
suggested U.S. intelligence agencies act to “inhibit coordinated activity of the black 
nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States.”152 Someone 
delivered this forgery to journalists in the United States, and it appeared in Soviet news 
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outlets as well as some foreign newspapers.153 The obvious intent of this forgery was to 
widen the racial fissures within America and tarnish the United States’ international image.  
Similarly, according to Andrew and Mitrokhin, to stoke ethnical divisions between 
African Americans and Jewish Americans, the Soviet Union created and delivered 
pamphlets to black militant groups that claimed to be from the Jewish Defense League.154 
The pamphlets contained racial slurs and accused African Americans of attacking Jewish 
Americans.155 These blatant attempts at generating racial violence in America did not pan 
out quite like the Soviet Union hoped, but they demonstrate the extent the Soviet Union 
went to create divisions within a society.156 
The Soviet Union also used forgeries and disinformation in its active measures 
campaigns to meddle in U.S. elections. Andrew and Mitrokhin illustrate that the Soviet 
Union feared the Democratic nomination of Henry Jackson for the 1976 U.S. presidential 
elections.157 Although Jackson adopted an anti-homosexual stance and there was nothing 
to indicate he was gay, the authors note that the Soviet Union created and distributed forged 
documents—including a forged FBI memorandum—that accused Jackson of being a 
homosexual. Jackson did not win the nomination, but Andrew and Mitrokhin argue the 
active measures operation did not affect the election or Jackson’s career.158 On the other 
hand, the Soviets’ aim may simply have been to sow doubt—at which task this campaign 
was moderately successful.159 
This election was one of many in which the Soviet Union used active measures to 
interfere. Other examples according to Andrew and Mitrokhin include the 1965 British 
Parliament general elections against a conservative candidate, the 1974 French presidential 
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election in favor of the French Communist Party candidate, the 1980 German Bundestag 
election in favor of the Socialist Democratic Party, the 1981 French presidential election 
against all candidates, and the 1984 U.S. presidential election against Reagan.160  
3. Agents of Influence 
Recruiting or emplacing people who could act as agents of influence was a primary 
black technique for the Soviet Union’s active measures program. The KGB used recruited 
assets to influence government officials, group leaders, or the public in ways that were 
beneficial for the Soviet Union. The intelligence community labeled these people as agents 
of influence, and they could be undercover KGB agents, witting assets, or unwitting 
assets—which some in the intelligence community have termed as “willies”161 or “useful 
idiots.”162 Unwitting agents were unaware they were helping the Soviet Union; instead, 
the KGB typically manipulated them through various techniques to do the Soviet Union’s 
bidding.163 
During the Cold War, the majority of the Soviet agents of influence were journalists 
used to publish Soviet propaganda and surreptitiously influence the masses. According to 
Levchenko, a former KGB officer for Service A and defector, most “Soviet journalists 
[including those stationed in foreign countries] were intelligence officers, and those who 
were not still did work on behalf of the KGB.”164 Not only did Soviet journalists produce 
articles, but the KGB also penetrated journalists’ social circles to spot and assess them for 
recruitment as assets.165 Barron describes the Soviet emphasis on the recruitment of 
journalists when he details Levchenko’s career as a KGB agent who primarily worked as 
an undercover journalist in Japan.166 
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One writer or pseudo-journalist who was an efficient weapon for the Soviet Union 
was the disheartened former CIA agent Philip Agee. According to the Mitrokhin Archives, 
Agee approached the KGB to offer his assistance as a spy, but out of suspicion that he was 
a CIA dangle the KGB turned him away.167 The archives detailed how Agee then went to 
the Cuban intelligence service, where they recruited him and informed the KGB of his 
recruitment and potential. Through the Cubans, the KGB directed, funded, and assisted 
Agee with producing journals and writing books wherein he slandered CIA activities and 
published the names of CIA operatives working around the world.168 Agee estimated that 
he exposed 2,000 CIA officials, a betrayal so damaging that the U.S. government created 
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which made it a felony to expose U.S. covert 
agents.169  
According to a 1986 CIA report, the Soviet Union also used a grant program that 
sponsored the travel of foreign journalists to the that country.170 Once there, the Soviet 
Union showed them everything positive about the state.171 The CIA describes this grant 
program as “an important propaganda and active measures activity for the USSR.”172 
During an interview in 1984, Yuri Bezmenov, a former Soviet journalist and defector, 
explained that the foreign journalists had minders who were responsible for ensuring the 
journalists had an outstanding time to ensure they were unaware of any negative aspects 
concerning the communist country.173 Furthermore, he adds, the Soviet Union chose 
journalists to participate in the program whom they deemed were not inquisitive in an effort 
to increase the chance of the journalists writing favorable stories upon their return home.174 
Bezmenov stated that Soviet officials photographed the journalists while they were in 
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country to use as propaganda or blackmail if the visitors participated in any compromising 
activities.175 Soviet officials felt this program worked; according to the CIA “One Soviet 
official noted that, upon returning from the USSR, the foreign guests annually publish[ed] 
as many as 3,500 articles devoted to the Soviet Union.”176  
Another group of agents of influence that the Soviet Union highly regarded were 
those who could influence politicians and government officials on policies that strategically 
benefited the Soviet Union or undermined its adversaries. During a 1985 Senate Hearing 
on active measures, CIA Director Robert Gates testified that “Moscow’s ultimate objective 
is to develop agents of influence at the highest levels of foreign governments,” which 
would maximize their influence within a government.177 The KGB did not just recruit 
those who were already in a place of influence but instead looked for those who had the 
potential to become politically relevant, as was the case of Arne Treholt.178 The KGB 
initiated his recruitment while he was a journalist, but did not actively manage him until 
he served as the secretary for the Norwegian Minister for Trade and Shipping.179 In 1985, 
Norway convicted Treholt of spying for the Soviet Union from 1974–1984 and sentenced 
him to 20 years confinement. In addition to being a traditional spy used to steal classified 
documents, Treholt was also an agent of influence who exerted Soviet influence on 
Norway’s decisions not to deploy nuclear weapons in Norwegian territory.180 He also 
influenced the signing of the 1974 provisional agreement, which weakened Norway’s 
claim to large portions of the Barents Sea.181 
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4. Front Groups/Organizations 
According to the Hearing on Soviet Active Measures, “the use of fronts, of course, 
is as old as Lenin, who referred to them as ‘transmission belts.’”182 The Soviet Union’s 
use of front groups counts as “gray operations” as, for the most part, the groups’ ideology 
was similar to the Soviet Union. Still an attempt was usually made to conceal their direct 
affiliation with the Soviet Union. For example, such innocuous-sounding names as North 
American Christian Peace Conference or the Women for Racial and Economic Equality 
would not immediately link the group with Moscow.183  
As time elapsed and it became apparent that some of these front groups were just 
mouthpieces for the Soviet Union, the front groups themselves created front groups to hide 
Soviet affiliation. In 1985, Copp, who was a USIA policy officer on Soviet Disinformation, 
testified that one such group was the Generals for Peace (GFP).184 This revelation seemed 
to shock the senators on the Senate Hearing panel as the GFP consisted of 13 former NATO 
generals who advocated against nuclear proliferation and for the removal of all U.S. troops 
in Europe.185 Copp further testified that the KGB did not direct the GFP, but the World 
Peace Council (WPC)—notoriously known in the intelligence communities as a Soviet 
front group—created and funded the GFP.186  
Another benefit of utilizing front groups was the access that the NGOs had within 
the United Nations (UN), which essentially allowed the Soviet Union to discreetly inject 
propaganda and exert influence on UN delegates from around the world.187 A significant 
illustration of the magnitude of Soviet front organizations was a 1983 CIA Directorate of 
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Intelligence research paper titled Soviet International Fronts.188 In this document, the CIA 
depicts in a diagram the connections between Moscow and the various Soviet front 
organizations. The diagram shows that 10 major Soviet front organizations had more than 
1,000 affiliated groups operating worldwide through 25 regional organizations. 
Additionally, these affiliated groups created and controlled approximately 67 additional 
subsidiary front groups.189  
With so many front organizations as part of the Soviet active measures program, 
the Soviet Union had the resources to mobilize a large number of supporters to promote its 
agenda as it did when it undertook the campaign to prevent the U.S. deployment of nuclear 
forces in Europe. In 1979, because of the Soviet Union’s development and deployment of 
the nuclear-capable SS-20 intermediate ballistic missile, U.S. and NATO allies decided to 
deploy U.S. intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe.190 The U.S. INF deployments 
were a direct threat to Soviet security. As a result, the Soviet Union enacted a campaign to 
influence the public that placing these missiles in Europe was a provocation and an 
immediate threat to the safety of the entire world.191 The ID tasked the Soviet front 
organizations to start a “‘campaign from below’ and create mass opposition to the INF 
deployment by exploiting popular fears of nuclear weapons.”192 As such, the Soviet front 
organizations proceeded to organize massive demonstrations around the world to protest 
the positioning of U.S. INF, distribute anti-NATO propaganda, and engage the media to 
highlight the dangers of arms buildup.193 Additionally, the front groups publicized and 
mobilized support for the rallies not initiated by the front groups.194 Nuclear freeze protests 
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sprouted up in every major city around the world and drew large numbers, such as the 1981 
protest in Amsterdam that attracted 400,000 protestors and the 1982 rally in New York 
City that attracted over 500,000 demonstrators.195 Soviet front organizations engaged the 
UN and U.S. political representatives to influence the United States to adopt a nuclear 
freeze, and they were able to get U.S. representatives and state legislators to speak during 
conventions.196 In 1985, Gates testified that the CIA estimated during 1981 and 1982, the 
Soviet Union invested approximately $100 million into the INF active measures 
campaign.197 It is difficult to determine the impact the Soviet active measures had on the 
implementation of the INF treaty, but based on the amount of effort the front organizations 
exerted and the large sum the Soviet Union invested, it would be flawed to argue that it 
had no impact.  
C. COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES 
U.S. countermeasures fall into two broad eras. The first era ranges from the end of 
WWII until the election of President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. During the first era, 
although officials did not use the term “active measures,” the United States took a national 
public diplomacy approach to combat Soviet influence through President Harry Truman’s 
leadership and focus. As nuclear war became a frightening reality, the U.S. drive to combat 
Soviet influence waned. It was after Reagan’s election that the United States reinvigorated 
its programs to counter Soviet active measures. Thus, the second era ranges from Reagan’s 
election to the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991. The Reagan 
administration emphasized the collection of intelligence on Soviet active measures with 
the creation of the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) and used USIA to wage an 
all-out centralized public diplomacy war against Soviet malevolent influence.  
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1. First Era of Countermeasures: End of WWII to Reagan’s Election 
The first U.S. attempts to combat Soviet deception through active measures were 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s with President Harry Truman’s Campaign of Truth, which 
emphasized the use of American propaganda against the Soviet influence in Europe. In 
1947, Truman ordered the State Department to utilize the Voice of America (VOA), which 
was created as a weapon of influence against the Nazis in WWII, to start broadcasting in 
Russian.198 Truman intended to communicate directly with the people and “give listeners 
in the USSR a picture of life in America” to “broaden the bases of understanding and 
friendship between the Russian and American people.”199 The VOA aimed to connect with 
those secluded behind the Iron Curtain, whom the Soviet Union manipulated with its 
ideological propaganda to dismiss the Western way of life.200 
An initial problem was that the VOA’s equipment and infrastructure was not large 
enough to produce a quality broadcast and, as a result, the broadcasts were inaudible for 
the intended audience.201 Another problem was that the content of the shows reemphasized 
the communists’ negative portrayals of the capitalist system by highlighting the 
materialistic advantages of the American way of life.202 The State Department, which at 
that time controlled the VOA, coordinated with specialists from U.S. embassies and were 
able to focus the content to better relate to its intended target.203 The focused content 
helped with the planned outreach but it was short lived, as by the end of 1949, the Soviet 
Union was able to mostly jam the VOA broadcasts from reaching people living in 
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communist countries.204 The Soviet jamming did not deter the U.S. government from 
utilizing and investing in the VOA and continuing to exploit broadcasting as a tool against 
Soviet active measures throughout the Cold War.  
In 1948, the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act—which “legalized peacetime 
propaganda but forbid its use for domestic purposes”—led to the creation of the USIA in 
1953.205 The USIA absorbed the responsibility of operating the VOA and all U.S. overseas 
overt propaganda efforts including television, radio, press, and publication services.206 The 
USIA also used what it termed as “media control projects” that “were designed to influence 
the indigenous news media by planting news, placing programs on local television 
channels, and using personal contacts to influence the perspective of foreign journalists. 
Personal contacts were also used to influence influential opinion leaders.”207  
President Truman implemented various other techniques against Soviet 
disinformation. In 1950, Truman embarked on what he called the Campaign of Truth, 
designed to generate an all-out U.S. propaganda offensive against the Soviet ideology.208 
Not only did the U.S. government use propaganda to promulgate the American way of life, 
but under the Campaign of Truth, the government utilized it to defame communism by 
creating “hard-hitting propaganda in its most obvious form—cartoons depicting 
bloodthirsty communists, vituperative anticommunists polemics, and sensational 
commentary.”209 As part of the Campaign of Truth, the Truman administration encouraged 
the American public to help combat Soviet and communist influence by sending letters that 
championed the American way of life to relatives and associates who lived in Europe and 
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behind the Iron Curtain.210 The administration emphasized this approach during public 
speeches and by publishing articles in immigrant newspapers that provided instructions on 
how the American public could exploit this initiative.211 The administration highlighted 
the messages they wanted the public to include in their letters.212 The Truman 
administration essentially created a nationalized strategic communications effort and 
turned everyday Americans into propagandists to combat Soviet influence throughout 
Europe and the Soviet Union. The effectiveness of this creative approach is disputable 
because, as Rawnsley notes, it was impossible to know how many letters were written 
based on this initiative, the content of those letters, or if letters reached those who were 
most susceptible to Soviet influence.213  
The Truman administration also utilized the CIA to combat Soviet active measures 
and disinformation. Starting in 1950—in conjunction with the Campaign of Truth—the 
Truman administration initiated the Crusade for Freedom.214 As part of the crusade, the 
U.S. government created a covert CIA front organization named the National Committee 
for a Free Europe (NCFE) under the auspices of a “group of private citizens organized to 
help ‘exiled leaders from the prisoner countries of Central Europe’ and used their stories 
to inspire ‘peoples behind the Iron Curtain.’”215 The Crusade for Freedom was a 
nationwide fundraising campaign spanning several years wherein the NCFE raised funds 
to operate RFE and used to advertise RFE as “a private grassroots organization devoted to 
telling the truth to captives behind the Iron Curtain.”216 Unbeknownst to the American 
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public, the CIA oversaw RFE operations and covertly funded it until 1972 to conduct 
psychological warfare against Communist states.217 
The idea behind RFE was to create a U.S. propaganda machine as an alternative to 
the VOA, with the appearance of a privately funded radio broadcast utilizing émigrés as its 
voice.218 The privately funded appearance was necessary for two reasons. First, it 
eliminated the government bureaucratic content constraints that accompanied state-funded 
projects, much like the VOA.219 Second, it increased the credibility of the broadcasts as 
listeners viewed it independently from the U.S. government, which would considerably 
lessen the impression that it was a tool used to disseminate U.S. propaganda.220 The 
apparent intent behind utilizing émigrés as the voice of RFE focused on having people 
culturally relatable to the audience of a target country increasing the broadcasts’ credibility 
and developing a better connection between the audience and the broadcasters. 
RFE broadcasts were broadly varied but focused on news, commentary, and various 
forms of entertainment, such as music or stories.221 Spring details various RFE activities, 
which in addition to radio broadcasts included collecting various forms of intelligence as 
well as conducting balloon drops containing leaflets and sometimes containing medicine 
or Western commodities, such as soap.222 The balloon drops fell under the mission of what 
was dubbed the “Winds of Freedom” and eventually transformed into the production of 
“Free Europe Press,” which was designed to litter the Soviet bloc with strategic messages 
congruent with RFE broadcasts.223  
RFE, along with the many other broadcasting organizations such as the VOA and 
the British Broadcasting Company, was highly successful in its mission of informing and 
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appealing to the desires of the people trapped behind the Iron Curtain; so much that many 
accused it of inciting the 1956 Hungarian revolution with the implied promise of Western 
military support.224 After the Soviet Army mercilessly crushed the uprising, many were 
critical of the RFE’s mission and held it partially responsible for the massacre.225 Four 
independent organizations conducted investigations on the culpability of RFE in the 
Hungarian revolution, and for the most part, each one cleared it of any serious 
wrongdoing.226 With the aftermath of the Hungarian revolution, the U.S. government 
exerted more control over RFE broadcasts and issued guidance that tamped down the 
propaganda delivered to the Eastern Bloc countries.227 RFE, particularly later with the 
1976 merger of RFE and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), became a primary source of information 
for a large percentage of citizens living in the Soviet Union.  
During the 1950s and early 1960s, communications between the Unites States and 
the Soviet Union broke down, and it was not until the Cuban Missile Crisis that the two 
states developed direct communications line.228 By the late 1960s onward, the United 
States’ appetite to challenge Soviet disinformation and active measures subsided as the risk 
of war became a much-feared reality.229 The strategic mood went from confrontation to 
more cooperation for disarmament, and action against Soviet disinformation could not 
derail any potential progress under détente.230 Therefore, the U.S. government did not take 
any direct acts to confront Soviet active measures nor did they prioritize the collection of 
intelligence on such operations.231 Lamb and Schoen argue that another factor that 
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contributed to the U.S. government turning a blind eye to Soviet active measures was the 
U.S. domestic intelligence controversies in the 1970s, which resulted in reform of the 
intelligence services “that effectively downgraded the importance of disinformation and 
deception.”232 The cooperation over confrontation strategy continued into the late 1970s 
but with the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan the strategy waned, 
which led to the United States’ desire to confront the Soviet Union.233 America’s increased 
confrontational spirit opened the door for the second era, which culminated in the United 
States’ most aggressive efforts to counter Soviet active measures. 
2. Second Era of Countermeasures: The Reagan Administration to the 
Collapse 
The second era of countermeasures was when the United States reinvigorated its 
approach with the Soviet Union and took direct aggressive action to counter the influence 
of Soviet active measures. The Reagan administration prioritized the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence on Soviet active measures and used public diplomacy to 
weaponize the USIA against Soviet influence. With the AMWG, the United States created 
a reporting mechanism that informed the world about Soviet active measures. By the end 
of the Cold War, U.S. efforts against Soviet active measures began to pay off and 
perceivably had an impact against the Soviet threat. 
With the election of Reagan, the United States tossed the cooperation strategy out 
the window and proceeded with a campaign of direct confrontation.234 Reagan’s 
confrontation strategy led to the U.S. government addressing Soviet active measures head-
on, with the prioritization for the collection of intelligence on Soviet active measures and 
the rapid exposure of Soviet schemes and tactics. The Reagan administration countered 
Soviet influence through public diplomacy consisting of strategic messaging built on the 
truth, which resembled Truman’s approach. 
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With the appointment of new leadership under the Reagan administration, the CIA 
renewed itself and reinvigorated its collection of intelligence concerning Soviet active 
measures. The first major CIA product concerning Soviet active measures was its 1981 
top-secret study titled “Soviet Active Measures,” which described Soviet active measures 
operations.235 The information Reagan publicly used from the report was the CIA’s rough 
estimate that the Soviet Union spent approximately $100 million on an active measures 
campaign to develop opposition in Western Europe against the U.S. building the neutron 
bomb.236 Presumably, Reagan used this estimation to highlight the magnitude of the 
program to increase funding of countering Soviet influence operations. The CIA director 
also widely disseminated 3,000 copies of a secret version of the study with the intent “to 
raise consciousness and to suggest CIA action to counter the Soviets.”237 This publication 
was the first attempt to renew an emphasis—which increasingly grew during Reagan’s 
presidency—of focus to identify Soviet active measures.  
Early in his presidency, Reagan implemented policies to emphasize the importance 
of winning the ideological battle against the Soviet Union. In January 1983, the Reagan 
administration published National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), a classified 
document that outlines Reagan’s foreign relations policy with the Soviet Union.238 
Although this document did not mention active measures per se, the strategy did outline 
areas that related to countering Soviet influence telling of active measures. Specifically, it 
highlighted that the aim for U.S. policy was to “have an ideological thrust which clearly 
affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values … over the repressive features of Soviet 
Communism.”239 To achieve this objective, it specified the administration had to review 
and increase its efforts to “support democratic forces,” “highlight Soviet human rights 
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violations,” and strengthen its policy on “U.S. radio broadcasting.”240 On the propaganda 
front, the Reagan administration directed the U.S. to expose the Soviet double standards 
and avert the Soviet Union from winning the propaganda battle.241 Following the 
publication of NSDD 75, the Reagan administration took significant steps in combating 
Soviet active measures centered on identification and public exposure.  
Published almost concurrently with NSDD 75, the Reagan administration also 
released NSDD 77, which centralized most aspects of U.S. public diplomacy and public 
affairs under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) through a Special 
Planning Group (SPG).242 The directive also created four committees, responsive to the 
SPG, that were responsible for overseeing the incorporation of national security objectives 
into their respective areas of responsibility.243 The SPG’s four areas of responsibility were 
public affairs, international information, international political (democracy promotion), 
and international broadcasting.244 Utilizing these four committees, the NSC could 
coordinate and deliver a strong strategic communications agenda in line with its National 
Security Policy to overpower the Soviet propaganda initiatives. With NSDD 77, the 
Reagan administration elevated and prioritized the importance of using information in the 
ideological battle with the Soviet Union and against Soviet active measures.  
With NSDD 77, the Reagan administration tasked USIA to take responsibility for 
a new initiative called Project Truth.245 Project Truth focused on two primary goals. The 
first goal was to explain U.S. policies and objectives.246 The second goal was to identify 
and refute Soviet disinformation and misinformation.247 Project Truth emphasized the 
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collection and declassification of intelligence on Soviet active measures. It provided a 
mechanism for streamlined distribution through its monthly Soviet propaganda alerts and 
its rapid notifications on Soviet distortions and fabrications.248 The project, through its 
representatives from the major U.S. government agencies and departments—such as DoS, 
DOD, CIA, NSC, and various others—developed the capability to rapidly and accurately 
refute major Soviet active measures themes.249 
Much like a Soviet active measures campaign, Project Truth created focused 
communication themes that the Reagan administration promulgated through various media 
apparatuses to plant strategic messaging to the international public. One such theme was 
to project America as a peace party in an attempt to refute the Soviet active measures 
campaign of portraying the United States as a warmongering nation.250 The peace party 
theme intended to show the United States had a “defense and deterrent-oriented military 
strategy; and the Soviet Union the party threatening world peace, with its offensive doctrine 
and deployment.”251 Another more controversial theme was Washington’s 1981 allegation 
that it had scientifically proven the Soviet Union used a chemical agent in Afghanistan and 
Southeast Asia nicknamed Yellow Rain.252 Many scientists and academics discredited 
Washington’s allegation and dismissed its proof as scientifically invalid, raising the 
concern that Yellow Rain was just anti-Soviet propaganda.253 The U.S. government never 
admitted Yellow Rain was a disinformation campaign, but in 2005, the DoS did release a 
report that determined the evidence could not conclusively identify the substance or its 
origins.254 
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At the same time, the Reagan administration launched Project Democracy to 
overtly counter the Soviet Union’s portrayal that Western democracy was inferior to 
communism. Reagan described Project Democracy “as a major program in an ideological 
competition with the Communists.”255 The main effort focused on funding anti-communist 
regimes and organizations oriented toward reinforcing democratic institutions throughout 
the world with a primary concentration on the Soviet satellite states and developing 
countries.256 With Project Democracy, “the administration signaled a fundamentally new 
approach that dragged political action once and for all out of the shadows of the intelligence 
world and into the light, where it could be openly defended by senior officials and endorsed 
by the Congress.”257  
Project Democracy evolved into a Western public diplomacy organization that still 
exists today. Within two years, Project Democracy transformed into the congressionally 
funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was and currently is a private 
NGO used to support and spread liberalized democracy around the world.258 Much of its 
strategy was to provide large amounts of aid to overseas organizations that favored 
democratic institutions—one such example was the Solidarity movement in Poland.259 
Much controversy surrounded this organization, as some saw it as violating a state’s 
sovereignty or a U.S. tool of subversion and accused it of election meddling.260 
Nevertheless, the NED created an avenue through democracy promotion to reduce the 
Soviet influence and combat its active measures.  
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To achieve public diplomacy objectives outlined in the Reagan administration’s 
NSDDs and to counter Soviet active measures, the administration needed to revamp the 
neglected international broadcasting mission under the USIA. With NSDD 45, published 
in 1983 and reinforced with NSDD 130, released in 1984, Reagan emphasized international 
broadcasting as “an important instrument of national security policy of the United States” 
and afforded it the highest prioritization of national funding.261 NSDD 130 details 
international broadcasting as a “key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political 
and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the 
behavior of government” as well as a “strategic instrument of U.S. national policy, not a 
tactical instrument of U.S. diplomacy.”262 The U.S. government invested more than $2.5 
billion in modernizing its international broadcasting infrastructure and boosted the effect 
of the USIA broadcasting efforts.263 The intent behind the investment was to counter or 
make it costlier for Soviet jamming and to increase the reach of VOA and RFE/RL.264  
The USIA utilized its broadcasting capabilities to quickly capitalize on 
opportunities to get a narrative out on reactive issues before the Soviet Union had a chance 
to deploy an active measures operation. One such example was the 1983 information 
campaign organized around the Soviet Union’s shootdown of KAL 007. According to 
Snyder, the former director of USIA’s Television and Film Service, after the Soviet Union 
shot down the commercial plane, the Reagan administration, through public speeches, 
immediately went on the propaganda offensive and the USIA quickly aired information 
showing the Soviet Union’s culpability for the disaster.265 With Snyder’s oversight, the 
USIA created a video played to the UN Security Council of top-secret audio intercepts 
containing the Soviet pilots’ radio transmissions before and after the incident. Snyder notes 
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the USIA designed the video to convey “the Soviet Union had cold-bloodedly carried out 
a barbaric act.”266 Snyder claims the video forced the Soviet Union to admit it shot down 
the plane, but the Soviet Union avowed that its military thought KAL 007 was a U.S. spy 
plane. Snyder indicates it was true that the Soviet pilots did believe KAL 007 was a U.S. 
spy plane and unbeknownst to him at the time, the U.S. government altered the audio clips 
to make Moscow appear more negligent and vicious.267 In contrast, Romerstein argues 
that the Soviet Union’s excuse—that the pilots thought it was a U.S. spy plane—was 
disinformation that the Soviet Union unsuccessfully promoted through various active 
measures.268  
The USIA also capitalized on new emerging technology to increase its public 
diplomacy arsenal against the Soviet Union and its use of active measures. With the advent 
of satellite communications, the USIA established satellite linkups throughout its 
embassies and invited foreign journalists to attend interactive video-conferences wherein 
the journalists could directly question Washington’s top leaders.269 This satellite 
broadcasting program became known as Worldnet.270 Snyder describes that the USIA 
made Worldnet events a reoccurring spectacle and publicized them to ensure maximum 
participation of foreign journalists.271 After the Worldnet broadcasts, foreign journalists 
published stories in their local media referencing the information from the broadcasts.272 
As Worldnet grew, the USIA used it to conduct live broadcasts of Reagan’s speeches and 
other major U.S. political events.273 To facilitate greater local media press coverage, the 
USIA provided transcripts and copies of Worldnet recordings to attendees that the local 
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media outlets later televised, enhancing the credibility and dissemination of Washington’s 
public diplomacy effect.274 No longer did it appear that the U.S. government was 
advancing its agenda; instead, the local foreign media did it for Washington. The Soviet 
Union feared, as the satellite technology grew, the USIA would have the ability to beam 
daily televised programs directly into Soviet homes, showing them Washington’s truth.275 
With its imaginative use of emerging satellite technology, the USIA significantly enhanced 
the U.S. public diplomacy arsenal against all forms of Soviet influence, including its active 
measures.  
In 1981, the Reagan administration created the AMWG as the primary unit to 
collect and disseminate information about Soviet active measures, which grew to become 
the United States’ primary counter.276 The AMWG was an interagency group consisting 
of members from “NSC, FBI, CIA, USIA, DOD, DoS, and various other entities,”277 
which was initially under the responsibility of DoS but toward the end of the Cold War fell 
under the USIA.278 The Reagan administration made the group a top priority, giving it 
greater authority and providing it with the flexibility to incorporate information into its 
reports that U.S. intelligence agencies would typically safeguard from release on the 
grounds it was classified.279 The overall purpose for the AMWG was “to educate foreign 
and domestic government officials, journalists, researchers, and the public-at-large about 
how Active Measures are used to advance Soviet foreign policy goals.”280 With the 
creation of the AMWG, the United States increased its capacity to uncover and identify the 
Soviet Union’s use of active measures. 
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The AMWG primarily used its highly detailed reports and foreign affairs notes to 
educate both U.S. and foreign government officials as well as the international public on 
Soviet active measures tactics.281 The group compiled this information from various 
intelligence agencies, the DoS, and the USIA.282 A valuable source of information was 
from “overt collection through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and reports 
from USIA public affairs officers in embassies around the world.”283 The USIA overseas 
offices had unique access to foreign media. They collected and provided Soviet 
disinformation and forgeries discovered in the foreign media to the AMWG and members 
of the AMWG considered them a “front line unit for American defense.”284 To collect 
relevant information on Soviet tactics, members of the AMWG consulted with Soviet 
defectors who had an intimate knowledge of Soviet active measures because they helped 
design and implement them.285 Soviet defectors provided the AMWG with valuable 
insight that assisted with the production of reports, and they also testified before Congress 
on Soviet active measures.286  
The AMWG produced various reports based on the intelligence collected on Soviet 
active measures. Over the span of the AMWG’s existence (1981-1992), the group 
published more than 30 products related to Soviet active measures.287 The products ranged 
from short Foreign Affairs Notes to highly detailed congressional reports. The Foreign 
Affairs Notes detailed information on specific topics; examples include Communist 
Clandestine Broadcasting, Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries, and Soviet Fronts: 
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Women and Youth.288 The AMWG frequently produced Foreign Affairs Notes and the 
USIA disseminated them to foreign journalists and academics overseas.289 The larger 
reports such as responses to congressional requests or special reports were highly detailed 
and covered a wide range of Soviet active measures for a particular period. The AMWG 
increased its credibility by having high standards for accurate and factual reporting.290 
Members knew the group’s impeccable reputation would be what enabled it to counter 
Soviet active measures.291 As Congressman Gingrich said in 1986 with regard to the 
AMWG reporting on Soviet active measures, “it begins to establish the principle that we’re 
going to be aware that some of the reports that the media receives may be active measures. 
It gives people a place to go to check things out.”292  
The AMWG utilized the USIA’s international broadcasting capabilities to 
disseminate its revelations to the public overseas.293 The USIA not only refuted allegations 
but also highlighted programs or initiatives that the U.S. government was engaged in and 
directly contradicted the accusations from the Soviet active measures.294 For example, in 
Africa: to counter the claim that the United States created AIDS as an ethnic weapon, the 
USIA broadcasted information on AIDS research and how people could protect themselves 
and limit exposure to the virus that caused AIDS.295 The AMWG also utilized teams to 
travel to U.S. embassies abroad to educate foreign government officials, 
counterintelligence professionals, and foreign journalists on the techniques the Soviet 
Union used.296 With the travel teams, the AMWG increased foreign media awareness on 
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active measures that in turn increased the propensity for foreign journalists to fact-check 
with U.S. embassies before publishing potential disinformation or forgeries.297  
Toward the later years of the Cold War, top U.S. leadership used the information 
from the AMWG to confront Soviet officials on its use of active measures, leading to the 
Soviet Union to disengage from perpetuating specific active measures campaigns.298 
Confronting Soviet officials and the accuracy of the AMWG’s information put pressure on 
the Soviet Union, as they were unable to authenticate the disinformation published in Soviet-
controlled media.299  
Overall, the AMWG’s efforts damaged the Soviet Union’s image and made it costlier 
for Moscow to use active measures. This effect was evident when Gorbachev confronted the 
U.S. secretary of state and demanded the United States stop publishing the AMWG reports 
accusing the Soviet Union of conducting active measures.300 In the later years of the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union requested the United States privately coordinate with them about 
disinformation allegations, and according to Schoen and Lamb, the USIA viewed this as a 
“clear sign that America’s efforts to raise the cost of Soviet disinformation were 
working.”301 The members of the group also felt they made an impact against Soviet active 
measures because the Soviet Union and its supporters attempted to discredit the group’s work 
to the extent of deploying active measures against the head of the group.302  
The Soviet active measures threat gradually subsided as the cooperation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States grew, but it was the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union that caused the United States to disregard the potential threats 
from Soviet active measures. With the unexpected end to the Cold War and the implosion of 
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the Soviet threat, the United States no longer saw a need for the AMWG.303 In 1992, the last 
remnants of the AMWG—one person—produced a final report and closed up shop.304 
D. CONCLUSION  
Reviewing the history of Soviet-era active measures reveals a country weaker in 
influence, lacking the soft power of the West, whose ideals were not attractive to the rest of 
the world. To compete with the rest of the world, the Soviet Union relied heavily on active 
measures to further its strategic interest and tarnish the reputations of its adversaries, 
particularly the United States. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied heavily on 
sometimes clumsy forgeries and disinformation, often marked by language deficiencies. The 
Soviet Union was isolated and not in tune with the Western world. It was so married to the 
communist ideology that it prevented the Soviet Union from connecting with the Western 
world, thus making it easier to identify its use of active measures. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union still used active measures as primary weapon of influence against the West and the 
United States.  
But the Cold War era was also a time when the United States recognized the Soviet 
Union as an adversary and treated it with more suspicion. The American people were 
generally unified in their belief that communism was inferior and evil; President Reagan 
referred to the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire. The United States used strategic 
communications and public diplomacy to explain American policy and tell its story to the 
world, which contradicted the Soviet narrative. The United States also highlighted the 
hypocrisy of Soviet policies and actions. By forming an organization focused on collecting 
and publicizing Soviet active measures techniques, the United States used truth and accuracy 
to gain credibility and educated the world about Soviet active measures. Ignoring Soviet-era 
active measures was not the answer, and the United States overcame them through an 
aggressive and concentrated effort of exposure.  
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It seems history has repeated itself and active measures have returned as a primary 
weapon of influence. If the United States ignores them, it does so at its own peril.  
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IV. RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES 
This chapter examines Russia’s use of active measures against the West since 1991. 
Russia is using the same basic techniques that the Soviet Union utilized during the Cold 
War, but it has significantly increased its capacity by taking advantage of 21st-century 
technology and the interconnected world. Russia has developed a more complex and 
decentralized apparatus and incorporated many more directorates than the Soviet Union 
had. This complex apparatus is using active measures to divide Western societies through 
its exploitation of political polarization, Russian dysphoria, and nationalistic views within 
a country. Russia’s active measures are not confined to a particular ideology; instead, 
Russia will exploit any topic to widen societal fissures. The research finds that Russia has 
reestablished the use of active measures as a primary form of influence.  
The chapter explains the circumstances that led Russia to reinvigorate active 
measures as a form of influence and the Russian military’s perspective of using 
asymmetrical tactics like active measures. It provides an overview of Russia’s apparatus 
used to implement active measures and concludes with an outline and examples of the 
active measures Russia deploys against the United States and the West. 
A. THE REBIRTH OF ACTIVE MEASURES 
During the 1990s, there was a tentative reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship, as 
evidenced by the unification of Germany and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START). Tensions resumed, however, as NATO expanded eastward and the so-called 
color revolutions in the new democracies among former Soviet republics punctuated their 
aspirations to exit from Moscow’s sphere of influence.305 The 2003 Rose Revolution in 
Georgia and the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine revealed to Russia that it was 
                                                 
305 For information on U.S.-Russian cooperation see “United States Relations with Russia: After the 
Cold War,” U.S. Department of State, June 4, 2007, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85962.htm. 
For information on NATO expansion, see “NATO Topics: NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, April 9, 2009, https://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/05-enlargement.html. 
64 
in serious jeopardy of losing influence of those states to the West.306 Russia blamed these 
revolutions on Western meddling with the goal of encircling Russia.307  
The perceived Western incursion into Russia’s post-Soviet space led Russia to the 
realization that it lacked the influence it previously had during the Soviet era, and this 
realization put Russia on the offensive.308 Thus, as Saari notes, after the Orange 
Revolution, Russia invested many resources in all aspects of its influence programs with a 
goal to catch up to the West and to improve its own image.309 Saari explains that Russia 
attempted to mirror its influence with Western public diplomacy to generate a high level 
of soft power. However, underlying Russia’s attempts to create what has essentially 
become internationally accepted forms of soft power through public diplomacy was 
Russia’s use of active measures. Saari indicates that after the Orange Revolution there was 
evidence that Russia began to progressively use different forms of Soviet-inspired active 
measures as a means of influence.310 
One of Russia’s first large-scale use of active measures after the Orange Revolution 
that received mass media attention was Russia’s alleged attack on Estonia, which became 
known as the “Bronze Night.”311 Lucas and Pomeranzev argue that the “Bronze Night” 
was “a defining moment in the development of information operations as a tool in Russia’s 
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hybrid warfare kit.”312 The authors accuse Russia of deploying active measures in the form 
of an extensive disinformation campaign and in mobilizing various ethnic Russian groups 
to protest and exert influence on the Estonian government. Estonia managed to avert a 
large-scale disaster, but as the authors note, Russia’s use of active measures did not stop, 
and Russia deployed similar tactics against Georgia in 2008 and later in Ukraine.313 
One of the first public acknowledgments of Russia’s rebirth of Soviet active 
measures came from the Czech Republic. In 2009, the Czech Republic’s intelligence 
service—Security Information Service (BIS)—released its 2008 Annual Report on threats 
against the Czech Republic.314 In the report, BIS confirms that “Russia readopted the 
Soviet practice of using active measures to promote its foreign policy interests 
worldwide.”315 The BIS report indicates that Russian active measures included the use of 
propaganda, which harkened back to the “forms and methods successfully employed by 
the Soviet espionage in the 1980s to influence the Western peace movement.”316 The 
report also indicates that the Russian intelligence service exploited political movements 
and businesses as a means of influence that the Soviet Union also heavily utilized during 
the Cold War.317 By 2008, the West was slowly waking up to Russia’s use of active 
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measures, but arguably it was not until Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and later 
Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, that the West truly became aware 
of Russia’s use of active measures as a tool of malevolent influence. 
B. RUSSIA’S MILITARY PERSPECTIVE  
In 2013, high-ranking Russian military officers published two articles in Russian 
military journals explaining their views of 21st-century warfare or what they termed as 
new generation warfare (NGW). These articles opened a window into the Russian 
military’s perspective on what the authors describe as the West’s use of non-military means 
through asymmetrical methods to conduct warfare and advance its strategic interests 
throughout the world. The authors include examples of asymmetrical methods of 
information and psychological warfare, which closely resemble active measures the Soviet 
Union used during the Cold War. The authors also advocate for Russia to research and 
develop better ways to use asymmetrical methods to obtain strategic objectives and even 
imply that Russia should use them as offensive weapons. 
In February 2013, Gerasimov published an article in a Russian military journal 
explaining his views on the advancements in warfare.318 He specifies “the very ‘rules of 
war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals 
has grown, and in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their 
effectiveness.”319 Gerasimov explains that Western warfare has evolved to include 
nonmilitary means as precursors to create circumstances to justify the use of conventional 
military force.320 As Bartles points out in his analysis of Gerasimov’s article, from the 
Russian perspective the West’s use of military force in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan all 
precipitated with “finding a pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of mass 
destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change.”321 From 
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the Russian perspective, “Instead of an overt military invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. 
attack come from the installment of a political opposition through state propaganda (e.g., 
CNN, BBC), the Internet and social media, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)”322—similar to the tactics defined as active measures. Bartles explains that, as 
social diffusion and unrest grows, state authorities in the victim-state are forced to act to 
maintain control of society, in turn providing the West with a perceived justification to 
intervene with more overt and covert support. Finally, once the government collapses, 
Western forces in the form of peacekeepers are deployed to prop up a government that is 
amicable to the West.323 Based on Gerasimov’s article, Russia perceives the West’s 
modern tactics of war inherently as manufacturing instability that creates the opportunity 
to effect regime change. 
While Gerasimov does not mention active measures per se, he does highlight his 
understanding of the seriousness of the active measures threat when he writes, “The 
information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential 
of the enemy.”324 Additionally, he includes the use of informational measures in a list of 
activities he associates with Western methods of conflict.325 Russia’s 2014 Military 
Doctrine also highlights Russia’s understanding of the active measures threat wherein it 
specifies subversive information activities as both internal and external military risks to 
Russia.326 From Bartles’ analysis of Gerasimov’s article,327 Russia perceives that the 
initial acts of the West waging war in the 21st century essentially begins with the use of 
active measures deployed within the information space. 
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After explaining his views on the Western approach to modern warfare, Gerasimov 
calls on Russia’s military scholars to research this contemporary approach to war. He 
indicates that Russia must compete with the West in this realm and “outstrip them and 
occupy leading positions ourselves.”328 From Gerasimov’s perspective, Russia is justified 
in utilizing asymmetric methods of warfare—such as active measures—because that was 
how the West advanced its strategic interests. Not only does he encourage their use but it 
also seems he intends Russia to take an aggressive approach in developing the methods of 
the asymmetrical utilization of non-military means in modern warfare. Arguably, the 
military heard his call to action: since 2013, the reports of Russia’s use of asymmetrical 
methods to include active measures has steadily increased. 
As mentioned earlier, two Russian military officers published a follow-on article to 
Gerasimov’s wherein, without using the actual term, they indicated active measures were 
a foundational tactic in what they termed as NGW.329 According to retired General-
Lieutenant Bogdavov and Reserve Colonel Chekinov, NGW is the future of warfare and is 
heavily reliant on the use of non-military asymmetrical methods. A primary emphasis in 
their explanation of NGW is the use of information and psychological warfare as a primary 
factor for ensuring victory over an adversary. The information and psychological warfare 
methods they describe closely resemble or mirror Soviet active measures used during the 
Cold War. They mention using public institutions—such as NGOs, religious organizations, 
cultural institutions, and public movements—to damage a victim state’s social system, 
which mirrors the Soviet Union’s use of front groups. The authors essentially describe the 
Soviet Union’s use of agents of influence when they detail the method of using undercover 
agents or manipulating people in influential positions to sway government officials, 
military leaders, or the public to take action that strategically benefits an aggressor state. 
The authors also reference using disinformation multiple times throughout the article. They 
describe disinformation as a method to be used against the public to create chaos or to 
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incite subversion as well as against government officials to cause confusion or to mask the 
aggressor-state’s actions.330 
As part of the authors’ conclusion, they write “the Russian Armed Forces must be 
ready to fight new-generation wars in the medium and long terms and to use indirect, arm’s 
length forms of operations.”331 In other words, the world should anticipate an increase in 
Russia’s use of active measures long into the foreseeable future. Not only should the world 
anticipate an increase in the use of active measures, but because the authors caution “a 
country preaching a defensive doctrine may get the short end of the deal,”332 Western 
leaders must anticipate that Russia’s use of active measures will only grow more aggressive 
and offensive in nature. 
C. RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES APPARATUS 
The Russian active measures apparatus is noticeably different from the Soviet 
Union’s centralized active measures apparatus. Whereas during the Soviet era three entities 
made up the active measures apparatus, Russia has developed a decentralized yet 
compartmentalized structure that allows Russia plausible deniability and has incorporated 
many different directorates that conduct active measures. The Presidential Administration 
is somewhat similar to the role that the ID played within the Soviet active measures 
apparatus in that it acts as a loose overseer and coordinator within Russia’s active measures 
apparatus. However, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia’s active measures are developed 
through a bottom-up approach. 
1. The Presidential Executive Office 
The Presidential Executive Office, more commonly referred to as the Presidential 
Administration, is Putin’s executive branch, which manages all aspects of the government. 
According to the Russian Federations’ webpage, the Presidential Executive Office “is a 
state body providing support for the President’s work and monitoring implementation of 
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the President’s decisions.”333 It consists of presidentially appointed representatives from 
the major directorates, which enables Putin to have political control over the 
government.334 Putin provides the Presidential Administration with overall strategic 
guidance, and it is up to the Presidential Administration to disseminate his intent to the 
various directorates and agencies.335 However, the exact tactical application is left up to 
the specific agency, which provides Putin with a large degree of plausible deniability as he 
can declare he was unaware of a particular operation.336 
Regarding active measures, the Presidential Administration provides coordination 
between the many different directorates as these directorates are mostly 
compartmentalized.337 This structure allows the Russian government the ability to create 
competition between the different entities.338 The Presidential Administration provides 
guidance on the broad objectives of specific active measures, and it is up to the directorate 
and its employees to create ideas on how to best achieve these objectives.339 This bottom-
up approach creates an environment that promotes innovation and creativity.340 The 
agencies will use many different active measures themes or operations to achieve broad 
objectives. When an operation becomes successful, the Presidential Administration will 
coordinate with the different agencies to advance the most influential operational 
themes.341 Soldatov and Borogan argue that the Presidential Administration directs non-
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state hacker groups and Internet propagandists to deploy active measures against Russia’s 
adversaries.342 The Presidential Administration also coordinates with Putin to obtain 
approval for active measures operations that have the potential to create significant political 
consequences for the Russian Federation.343 
According to Galeotti, aside from the intelligence services, there are primarily six 
agencies that the Russian government relies on to implement active measures each with a 
department head that is part of the Presidential Administration344: 
1. Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate: Focuses on the influence of the 
foreign business sector on matters that can further Russia’s strategic 
interests, such as sanctions relief. 
2. Presidential Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural 
Contacts with Foreign Countries: In conjunction with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MID), it assists with active measures to influence the 
global community of Russians living outside Russia. 
3. Presidential Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with 
the Commonwealth of Independent States Member Countries, the 
Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia: Oversees the 
active measures operations that are focused on influencing Russia’s “near 
abroad.” 
4. Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate: Oversees the active measures 
operations to influence the political parties and politicians in European 
countries. 
5. Presidential Press and Information Office: Oversees the media 
apparatus for Russia’s active measures. Galeotti also notes it is highly 
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likely that this Directorate also coordinates with the social media 
influencers such as the troll farms. 
6. Presidential Experts’ Directorate: Oversees the think tanks and research 
organizations that produce pro-Russian intellectual products or developed 
strategies on using active measures to further Russia’s strategic 
interests.345 
Galeotti notes that within the Presidential Administration several other independent 
presidential councils focus on coordinating with entities such as the Russian Orthodox 
Church or assisting with the funding for different Russian front groups abroad.346 In 
conjunction with the other Presidential Administration agencies, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MID)—similar to the U.S. DoS—influences and funds the many different Russian 
NGOs and civic groups abroad.347 
2. Intelligence Services 
The three Russian intelligence services that emerged from restructuring after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and have a role in Russia’s active measures, are the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR) (Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki), the Federal Security Service 
(FSB) (Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti), and the GRU.348 Each intelligence service 
operates independently of the other, creating an environment of fierce competition and a 
considerable overlap of duties.349 As Tsypkin describes, “there are no formal horizontal 
links between these agencies,” and Russia typically coordinates the intelligence services’ 
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activities through the higher echelons of government.350 Putin maintains direct control 
over the FSB and the SVR through the Presidential Administration.351 Putin also maintains 
direct control over the GRU through the Minister of Defense, who is a member of the 
Security Council, which Putin presides over.352 Putin also exerts influence over the 
intelligence services through informal links in the form of personal relationships with the 
presidentially appointed heads of each service.353 
Galeotti notes that the SVR does engage in active measures, but for the most part, 
it focuses its efforts on traditional forms of intelligence activities.354 However, with its 
worldwide reach, it does expend resources to identify agents of influence and manage 
“illegals”—covert intelligence agents who assume a false identity and operate illegally 
within a country and who attempt to gain access to a nation’s policy-making circles or 
recruit assets who already have access.355 
The FSB’s active measures, according to Galeotti, mainly focus on political 
influence operations.356 These activities include assassinations, infiltrating the Russian 
immigrant communities, and conducting cyber operations to gain access to information 
that Russia can use to supplement its active measures.357 Not only does the FSB have its 
own cyber capabilities, but according to Watts the FSB also “creates plausible deniability 
for the Russian government by co-opting, compromising, or coercing ‘patriotic Russians’ 
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to do their bidding, whether they be notorious cybercriminals, international companies, or 
highly connected oligarchs acting as extensions of the Russian state.”358 
Most reports of the GRU’s involvement with active measures revolve around cyber-
hacking to obtain information that Russia can use as part of its active measures. The GRU 
is also heavily involved in the military aspects of active measures, which include 
assassinations and paramilitary support. There are also reports of the GRU directing 
Russian-affiliated groups, such as the Night Wolves, and infiltrating radical right groups 
to recruit agents of influence.359 Finally, the GRU operates within the social media 
realm— for instance, during the attempted 2016 Montenegro coup, when GRU operatives 
created false social media accounts to create the appearance of increased discontent to 
generate sedition.360 
D. RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES  
Russia predominantly uses the same three active measures techniques the Soviet 
Union utilized albeit modified: media disinformation, forgeries, and agents of influence. 
Although they assume the same role, for the most part, Russia has substituted NGOs, 
government-organized NGOs (GONGO), and civic groups in place of the Soviet front 
groups as a form of active measures. 
1. Media Disinformation 
Moscow utilizes a multifaceted media apparatus to deploy its active measures in 
the form of disinformation. However, this thesis research is limited to Russia’s use of its 
overt external media and social media. Russia’s overt external capability mostly resides in 
its two state-controlled media platforms of RT—formerly operated under the name of 
Russia Today—and Sputnik. These two media platforms are considered white operations 
as they are directly tied to the Kremlin. Even though RT’s Editor-in-Chief Margarita 
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Simonyan stated the Kremlin did not “dictate” what RT reported, many—to include RT 
employees—have contradicted her claims and have described it “as a propaganda tool for 
the Russian government.”361 Not only does the Russian government utilize its media to 
conduct active measures, but it also deploys grey and black operations through social 
media. With this multi-faceted approach and using 21st-century technology, Russia can 
deploy its active measures in the form of disinformation against almost any segment of the 
world’s population to further its strategic interests. 
a. Russia’s External Media 
In response to the Orange Revolution, to increase its external influence capacity, 
Russia launched RT in 2005. The Kremlin funds RT, and it operates on an excess of $300 
million per year.362 According to its website, RT’s motto is “Question More,” which it 
facilitates through reporting “stories overlooked by mainstream media, provid[ing] 
alternative perspectives on current affairs, and acquaint[ing] international audiences with 
a Russian viewpoint on major global events.”363 Watts describes that RT’s motto of 
“Question More” was not geared toward providing answers; instead, it focused on sowing 
doubt in people’s minds to make them believe “that nothing can be trusted, and if you can’t 
trust anyone, then you’ll believe anything.”364  
According to Herpen, in 2008 as a result of the Russo-Georgian War, RT 
transitioned from a platform of soft power to actively disseminating disinformation to 
influence the war in favor of Russia.365 After the war, in 2009, RT shifted its reporting to 
highlight the negative aspects of the West, and it focused its reporting on topics such as 
“growing social inequality, the fate of homeless people, mass unemployment, human rights 
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violations, and the consequences of the banking crisis.”366 Additionally, it provided a 
platform for conspiracy theorists that promulgated such outlandish claims as that the U.S. 
government orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, President Obama not being a native-born 
American, and America amassing forces in Afghanistan to invade Russia.367 
RT’s website boasts that RT is available in more than 100 countries, with its largest 
audience in Europe with 43 million viewers, and 11 million viewers in the United States.368 
The website also touts its sizeable online presence and states it is the number one viewed 
YouTube TV news network.369 Even though some dismiss its popularity as the 
promulgation of infotainment, nonetheless, RT’s popularity provides the Kremlin a broad 
international active measures platform to disseminate its disinformation.370 Unlike during 
the Cold War, it gives Russia unfettered access to the Western population. 
Sputnik, a smaller platform than RT, is a state-owned international radio 
broadcasting agency and online news outlet. Sputnik’s websites advertise it as a “modern 
news agency whose products include newsfeeds, websites, social networks, mobile apps, 
radio broadcasts, and multimedia press centers.”371 It reports in 31 languages and costs 
Russia approximately $69 million per year to operate.372 Russia created Sputnik in 2014 
by merging its Voice of Russia (international broadcasting agency) and the RIA Novosti 
news agency which was APN during the Soviet era.373 According to Fedchenko, Russia 
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launched Sputnik during the Euromaidan demonstrations in Ukraine.374 It is likely that the 
Euromaidan demonstrations led Russia to the realization that it still could not influence its 
“near abroad,” which caused Russia to consolidate and modernize its tools of influence.375 
Much like the Soviet Union did—minus the ideological component of 
communism—Russia uses its media to divide the West. According to Lucas and Nimmo, 
Russia’s media promotes radical and fringe beliefs that go against the mainstream beliefs 
of a nation.376 Nimmo argues Russia’s media “grant[s] disproportionate coverage to 
protest, anti-establishment and pro-Russian MEPs [members of the European Parliament] 
from CEE [Central and Eastern Europe]; that it does so systematically; and that even when 
it quotes mainstream politicians, it chooses comments that fit the wider narrative of a 
corrupt, decadent and Russophobic West.”377 As examples, Lucas and Nimmo cite RT’s 
impartial support of ultranationalist parties across Europe and its promotion of Scotland’s 
independence from the United Kingdom.378 A prominent example in the United States was 
RT’s overwhelming support for the Green Party and its 2016 presidential candidate Jill 
Stein. RT hosted Green Party debates and provided Stein with ample air time to explain 
her platform, which was increasingly supportive of the Kremlin.379 Russia’s media 
platforms have also portrayed right-wing radicals as experts, such as labeling Ryan 
Dawson—a well-known Holocaust denier—as a “human rights expert” and “peace 
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activist.”380 It appears RT portrays radicals as experts to represent their beliefs as a 
majority view. 
A well-known example of Russia using its external media to spread misinformation 
and disinformation as a means of influence is the 2016 “Lisa Case” wherein Russia’s media 
used false information to tarnish the German government. In 2016, a 13-year-old German 
girl went missing and reappeared the next day alleging that Arab-looking men had abducted 
and raped her.381 A Russian news reporter in Germany reported on the allegation, which 
was rapidly picked up by Russia’s mainstream news outlets.382 The German police 
identified the story as false, made public statements that the victim recanted her story, and 
released cell phone records that showed the allegation was false.383 Instead of reporting 
the police had debunked the allegation, Russian media continued to perpetuate the original 
story as disinformation and alleged the German police were trying to cover up the 
allegation.384 As a result, anti-immigrant demonstrations and protests developed 
consisting of German-Russian minorities and anti-immigrant groups.385 
To determine themes of Russian disinformation, Orlova et al., who write and 
research for Stopfake—a Ukrainian-based independent fact-checking organization—
analyzed articles and stories from Russian sources that Stopfake deemed as false.386 From 
March 2014 to June 2017, Stopfake identified 919 fake Russian stories or messages; of 
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those, 804 were news stories.387 After analyzing 500 of these articles, Orlova et al. 
conclude that most of the fake articles concentrated on influencing people that the Ukraine 
armed forces and the volunteers fighting on behalf of Ukraine had an illegitimate cause 
and were committing atrocities against the people of Ukraine.388 Additionally, the authors 
describe that some of the fake stories blamed the West for the war in Ukraine and indicated 
Western nations were using contractors to fight against the Ukrainian separatist forces.389 
It is evident that Ukraine is a primary strategic interest of Russia and Russia has used its 
media platforms to wage an information war to delegitimize the Ukrainian government. 
However, the authors note that toward the end of 2015, they started seeing false stories 
about the war in Syria that paralleled Russia’s entrance into the Syrian conflict.390 These 
disinformation themes illustrate that Russia’s use of disinformation to achieve its strategic 
objectives echo Russia’s military thinking concerning war in the 21st century. 
Russia has used its active measures to discredit NATO’s increased role in the Baltic 
states. According to Nimmo, in 2016, after NATO announced future efforts to enhance its 
presence in the Baltic states to deter Russian aggression, Russia began a campaign to attack 
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Nimmo argues that Russia has used its state media 
to publish negative stories about NATO’s presence.391 The top four themes during this 
time— which accounted for more than 90 percent of the articles—were “the Baltic states 
are paranoid and/or Russophobic,” “NATO is unwelcomed/NATO troops are occupants,” 
“NATO cannot protect the Baltic States,” and “NATO’s actions are provocative/
aggressive.”392 With these themes, it appears Russia is following the same strategy that 
the Soviet Union did during the Cold War and is trying to weaken the NATO alliance, 
which will in turn strengthen its geopolitical position within the region. 
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b. Social Media 
According to Paul and Matthews, Russia uses a “firehose of falsehood” to exert its 
influence throughout the world.393 With this approach, the authors argue that the Kremlin’s 
playbook uses many different media apparatuses to blast its audiences with disinformation. 
They expound that if people hear a constant stream of disinformation from multiple 
sources, they are more inclined to believe it.394 The firehose approach has become evident 
with Russia’s use of social media to flood many different platforms with its disinformation. 
Russia has used the social media platforms of Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, Tumblr, 
Twitter, Reddit, and other smaller platforms as a means to exert its influence on the 
United States.395 
Russia envisioned using social media and the Internet as a tool of influence long 
before the Western World realized the severity of this threat. In 2009 Russia created a 
school that Soldatovv and Borogan describe as the “Kremlin School of Bloggers” which 
taught its students how to use the Internet as a tool of influence.396 Once students 
completed the course, Russia directed them to carry out and organize Russia’s online 
information influence operations.397 The bloggers fill online forums with pro-Kremlin 
comments and leave defamatory comments on websites that are critical of Russia.398 This 
school seems to be the start of what would evolve into Russia’s massive efforts to use the 
Internet as a platform of influence.  
Chen notes that in 2015, a Russian newspaper reported that Russia spent 
approximately $400,000 per month to operate the Internet Research Agency (IRA).399 The 
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IRA is a company operated by a Russian oligarch who was a close associate of Putin and 
employed hundreds of employees to conduct round-the-clock influence operations on 
many different online social media platforms.400 IRA operators are provided with daily or 
weekly themes for what the Kremlin deems as primary topics of influence.401 It is up to 
the individual operator to determine how to best implement the designated theme. The 
themes can be used to spread conspiracy theories, disseminate disinformation, attack 
Russian critics, or create noise.402 The operators also use automated bots that rapidly 
amplify and broadly disseminate Russia’s active measures.403 This amplification creates a 
false sense of popularity about the information, which in turn increases its credibility 
through social proof.404 Some disinformation campaigns attributed to the IRA are the 
chemical plant explosion in Louisiana, an Ebola outbreak in Atlanta, and PizzaGate, which 
falsely alleged that a pizza restaurant in Washington, DC, was a cover for a child sex ring 
that Hillary Clinton helped set up.405 These disinformation campaigns were initiated on 
social media and rapidly grew in popularity when local Western media outlets picked up 
the stories and disseminated them as misinformation. PizzaGate, in particular, generated 
such a buzz that a North Carolina man traveled to the restaurant with a weapon to 
investigate the allegation and ultimately discharged his weapon in his search for the abused 
children.406 
Weisburd, Watts, and Berger note that Moscow’s social media propaganda falls 
into four primary categories of influence: political messages, financial propaganda, social 
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issues, and fear of global calamity.407 For political messages, they argue that the Kremlin 
designs its social media influence to “tarnish democratic leaders or undermine 
institutions.”408 They provided examples such as “allegations of voter fraud, election 
rigging, and political corruption.”409 For social issues, they explain that Russia exploits 
and magnifies the many different social issues that can polarize a nation, such as “police 
brutality, racial tensions, protests, anti-government standoffs, online privacy concerns, and 
alleged government misconduct.”410 In regard to the financial propaganda, they argue that 
Moscow intends to lessen “confidence in foreign markets” and to suggest that capitalist 
economies are failing.411 Lastly, the authors note that Russia uses conspiracy theories to 
incite fears that the world is in peril.412 They use examples such as “stoking fears of 
Nuclear War” and promulgating such conspiracies as the Jade Helm413 to forward ideas 
that the U.S. government was implementing martial law.414 Most of Russia’s social media 
influence operations are classified as black operations as Russian operatives take measures 
to hide their Russian affiliation. 
Robert Mueller III’s 2016 grand jury indictment of 13 Russian citizens and three 
companies provides an illustrative example of Russia’s use of social media to influence. 
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Russia used social media in an attempt to influence U.S. politics.415 Mueller explains that 
the accused used virtual private networks to mask their operating location and created 
countless numbers of false social media accounts pretending to be American citizens 
posting politically charged posts.416 Additionally, they created social media groups that 
purported to represent grassroots political movements within America.417 Mueller alleges 
false social media groups exploited social and political movements in the United States; 
topics included immigration, the Black Lives Matter movement, religion, and regional or 
geographical concerns.418 
Mueller accuses the indicted organizations of directing its operators to make social 
media posts that “create[d] ‘political intensity through supporting radical groups, users 
dissatisfied with [the] social and economic situation and oppositional social 
movements.’”419 The accused did not just rely on the Internet to obtain information to 
influence U.S. politics. Some of the accused, according to Mueller, traveled to the United 
States to gather intelligence that would help their political influence operations and 
purchase computer hardware to aid in concealment of their activities.420 Finally, the 
indictment alleges that the accused co-opted and funded Americans to stage rallies and 
protests throughout the United States. Mueller indicates that in one incident, the accused 
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paid an American to dress up in a Hillary Clinton costume and ride around in a cage 
constructed on the back of a truck for a protest rally in West Palm Beach, Florida.421 
Mueller explains that the accused also organized rallies in multiple cities of which most 
were supportive of candidate Trump.422 However, Mueller indicates that after the elections 
the accused also attempted to organize rallies that questioned the legitimacy of the vote 
simultaneously while they coordinated Trump support rallies.423 It appears that Russia 
intended to play both sides against each other to further incite the political polarization 
within the United States. 
With Russia’s operations to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the New 
York Times reports that through Facebook alone, Russia’s posts reached 126 million users; 
on Twitter, they posted an excess of 131,000 tweets using more than 2,700 accounts.424 
Russian agents also used YouTube and Instagram as platforms of influence.425 YouTube 
curators identified “more than 1,100 videos totaling 43 hours of content” that they 
associated as part of Russia’s influence operations, but the curators also noted that the 
influence effect of these videos was less than marginal as they had relatively low numbers 
of views, totaling only 309,000.426 Russia’s use of Instagram was also minimal; 
Facebook—parent company of Instagram—identified more than 170 Instagram accounts 
that “posted about 120,000 pieces of Russia-linked content.”427 The Internet—primarily 
social media—has provided Russia unimpeded access to a nation’s population at a level 
that the Soviet Union could never have imagined. 
                                                 
421 Mueller III, para. 55, 77. 
422 Mueller III, para. 7. 
423 Mueller III, para. 57. 
424 Mike Isaac and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Broad Reach of Campaign Is Disclosed,” New York 
Times, October 30, 2017, sec. B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-
russia.html. 
425 Isaac and Wakabayashi. 
426 Isaac and Wakabayashi. 
427 Isaac and Wakabayashi. 
85 
2. Forgeries 
There is little evidence of Russia implementing fabricated documents in its active 
measures campaigns against the United States. However, there are a few reported examples 
of entities closely connected to Russia that have used forgeries to influence, to tarnish 
Russian critics, or to coerce as a form of blackmail. Russia has not abandoned the use of 
forgeries entirely as Russia has used them to influence Ukrainians and incite ethnic tensions 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Hulcoop et al. identified a campaign wherein a cyber hacking group—reportedly 
connected to Russian intelligence services428—stole, altered, and released documents with 
the intent to influence.429 The authors termed this process as “tainted leaks” and defined it 
as “the deliberate seeding of false information within a larger set of authentically stolen 
data.”430 Essentially, a hacking group will use cyber operations to hack into a victim’s 
email account and extract data. The hackers will then take a document or an email and alter 
its content in a way that conveys a particular message they want to highlight. The hackers 
can either leak the forgeries alone or in a bundle of unaltered items they stole from the 
hack. By releasing it as a package, they add legitimacy to the falsified document and make 
it more difficult to identify and refute. Russia’s media apparatus will then report on the 
leaks in which other media organizations rebroadcast the reports and unknowingly spread 
the falsified information as misinformation.431 
Hulcoop et al. provide two examples of identified tainted leaks, but they also 
illustrate that the hackers who obtained the documents for the identified tainted leaks also 
hacked over 200 government, civil society, industry, and military accounts from various 
countries.432 These cyber operations have theoretically provided the Russia-linked hackers 
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with a treasure trove of information, providing future opportunities to release additional 
tainted leaks. Examples of tainted leaks the authors present consist of a stolen report from 
David Satter’s—author and staunch critic of the Russian government—email account and 
two documents along with a budget report stolen from the Open Society Foundation 
(OSF)—a George Soros–funded organization that promotes liberal democracy throughout 
the world, which coincidentally happens to be an organization that Russia views as a direct 
threat to Russian security.433 
In the Satter-tainted leak, Hulcoop et al. describe that the hackers released an altered 
report originally sent to NED.434 The authors note that the alterations to the report made it 
appear that Alex Navalny—a Russian political activist and the main political opposition to 
Putin, whom some have described as “the man Vladimir Putin fears the most”435—and 
other anti-corruption Russian activists received foreign funding to finance some of their 
efforts in Russia.436 Additionally, they explain that Russia’s media reporting of the leaked 
document claimed it proved that the United States was using the CIA to induce a “color 
revolution” in Russia and that the allegations of corruptions at the highest levels of Russian 
politics was disinformation created to defame Russia’s leaders.437 
Similar to the Satter-tainted leak, the OSF-tainted leaks were altered to make it 
appear that the OSF was funding Navalny and financed his efforts of revealing Russian 
government corruption.438 According to Groll, both Navalny and an OSF representative 
denied the allegation that OSF funded Navalny or his organization.439 The objective 
behind the tainted leak was not only to discredit Navalny and his organization, but as Groll 
explains, was also “to tie Russia’s most outspoken and prominent dissident to one of the 
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Kremlin’s biggest enemies,” which was Soros through his work with the OSF.440 
Furthermore, the tainted leaks functioned as an opportunity to defame Soros and the work 
of the OSF.441 
Tainted leaks were also reportedly used against French president Macron during 
his 2017 presidential campaign to personally attack him and question his ethics.442 
However, the exact details of the forgeries are difficult to distinguish because the Macron 
campaign said they deliberately altered documents because they were aware of the 
Russian-linked hacking and wanted to discredit the influence of any potential leaks.443 
Russia has used forgeries as a form of active measures numerous times to inflame 
ethnic tension in Ukraine and to widen societal fissures within Central and Eastern Europe. 
Haines reports that Russia used forgeries leaked online and doctored photos to manipulate 
the public regarding the Ukrainian war.444 The forgeries that Haines describes were a 
fabricated Ukrainian presidential draft decree and a series of emails that gave the 
appearance that the president of Ukraine was intent on making a vast region in southern 
Ukraine, which sits outside of the Crimea peninsula, an autonomous region for the Crimean 
Tartars.445 The author implies the motivation behind these forgeries was to have other 
ethnic regions in Ukraine advocate for autonomous regions, and Russian media reporting 
following the leaks was meant to incite tension between the Crimean Tartars and 
Ukrainians. Haines also provides an example of a doctored photo of a pro-Ukrainian 
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demonstration wherein the fabricator(s)446 changed the text of a participant’s banner that 
altered the context of the demonstration with the intent of fueling ethnic tension between 
Poles and Ukrainians.447 It appears Russia is willing to utilize forgeries to manipulate the 
public in areas where they have significant strategic interests. 
Russia has purportedly used forgeries in Sweden as an active measures tactic to 
diminish support of NATO, the European Union (EU), and its support for Ukraine. Kragh 
and Åsberg explain that as of 2017, at least 26 suspected Russian forgeries were introduced 
into the Swedish media.448 The authors indicate the forgeries were of numerous methods, 
with most consisting of fabricated government correspondences and letters from various 
organizations. Additionally, they note that one was a fabricated satellite image purported 
to show NATO’s culpability for a near air-to-air collision in Swedish airspace and there 
was even a forged letter from the Islamic State that indicated Sweden was providing 
military support to the terrorist organization.449 Most of the forgeries appeared aimed at 
diminishing Sweden’s policymakers’ will to continue support of Ukraine.450 Russia has 
significant strategic interest in swaying Swedish policymakers. Russia does not want 
Sweden to join NATO, nor does Russia benefit from a stabilized Western-oriented 
Ukraine. It appears that these strategic interests have offset the reputational costs of using 
forgeries as a form of active measures. Russia has also used forgeries to create 
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Kompromat451 on individuals much like it did in 2009 against U.S. Diplomat Kyle Hatcher 
when its intelligence services created a fabricated video that falsely accused Hatcher of 
having sexual intercourse with a Russian prostitute.452 
Extended open-source research has uncovered limited examples of Russia using 
forgeries as a form of active measures against the United States. The forgeries that relate 
to the United States seemed targeted at tarnishing individuals and not at influencing the 
general public. While it is clear that Russia has not abandoned the use of forgeries as a 
form of active measures, currently it appears Russia has mostly not needed to resort to 
using this Soviet-era technique against the United States. Instead, it seems Russia has 
mainly reserved this technique in areas where they have a significant strategic interest such 
as Ukraine. In its effort to exert influence in the United States, Russia currently does not 
need to create forgeries to influence when they possess the cyber-hacking capability to 
obtain all the derogatory information needed in its active measures campaigns. A prime 
example of this is the massive document leaks from Russia’s hacking of the Democratic 
National Convention and the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign in 2016.453 
By releasing factual emails and documents that contained derogatory information, 
Russia was practically able to dictate the media narrative in the United States toward the 
latter half of the 2016 U.S. presidential race. As Applebaum mentions, the majority of the 
U.S. media was not so much concerned about who performed the hacking, who released 
the emails, or the motive behind the leaks; instead, the media focused on the content of the 
leaked emails, which seemed to be Russia’s intent behind the leaks.454 Russia does not 
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need to run the risk of creating defamatory forgeries as a form of influence when they can 
steal and release actual unaltered documents that achieve the same or better results. 
3. Agents of Influence 
Russia did not relinquish the Soviet-era tactic of recruiting agents of influence as a 
form of active measures. There are three differences in whom Russia recruits as agents of 
influence. First, through Russia’s access and successful exploitation of the media, it does 
not have to rely on recruiting journalists to introduce disinformation to the West; second, 
Russia uses its wealth as a way to buy agents of influence; and third, Russia is not 
ideologically constrained as the Soviet Union was with its commitment to communism. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia does not have to place a significant amount of time 
in recruiting agents of influence within the media. As previously mentioned, Russia has 
demonstrated it can exert influence through Western media platforms, which allows Russia 
to expend more effort toward recruiting agents of influence in more sensitive areas. 
Moreover, through the leaking of documents on Internet websites such as WikiLeaks, 
Russia has been able to use the Western media, specifically within the United States, as 
unwitting agents of influence and direct the media narrative. 
Another variance from the Soviet Union lies in Russia using its wealth to purchase 
agents of influence throughout the world, especially in Europe, as a form of active 
measures. Russia funds political parties and politicians who support a closer relationship 
with Moscow and who are supportive of pro-Kremlin policies. Polyakova et al. provide 
examples of how Russia is either directly or indirectly—through Russian-connected 
businesses—funding both left- and right-winged political parties.455 Russia uses both as it 
is not ideologically bound and instead will use anyone who can further its strategic 
interests. Polyakova et al. explain that in France, Russia openly funded Marine Le Pen in 
her 2017 presidential bid.456 Le Pen has regularly espoused support for Russia, and she 
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ran on a platform of France orienting itself more toward Moscow.457 Polyakova et al. note 
that in Germany, Russia has used such business ventures as Nord Steam 2 to entice political 
leaders to support Russia.458 The authors imply this foreign investment may have been 
what enticed former Vice-Chancellor Sigmar to take a softer stance against Russia and 
advocate for the removal of Russian sanctions.459 Furthermore, the authors provide 
another example of Russia’s business influences in Germany with former Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, who actively petitioned for deeper economic ties with Russia and in 
2005 accepted a board position with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.460 They explain that 
in the UK, Russia has indirectly—through various Russian-connected businesses—funded 
numerous political parties and political leaders.461 Russia using its money to buy influence 
in the post-Soviet space is even more prevalent as Herpen provides examples from states 
including Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.462 While Russia may not 
have total control over these politicians and political parties, common sense indicates that 
Russia’s money buys it a degree of influence. 
In the United States, there are strict laws that prevent politicians from accepting 
foreign campaign funds, but these laws do not prevent Russia from using its money to buy 
influence within U.S. policymaking circles. Since 2006, Russia has used its money to 
purchase lobbying firms that work as paid agents of influence for the Kremlin.463 While 
historically a vast majority of countries have employed lobbying firms to influence 
Washington, it is only within the 21st century that Russia has used them as an agent of 
influence.464 Herpen notes that one of the firms that Russia has consistently utilized is 
Kissinger Associates, whose founder, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, regularly 
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met with Putin.465 He specifies that in 2009, Thomas Graham—who led the lobbying 
firm’s Russian department—wrote a report that advised the newly elected Obama 
administration on its international relations policy with Russia. Herpen explains that 
Graham’s report advised to halt efforts on NATO expansion, to positively consider 
Russia’s proposition to create a new security architecture in Europe, to promote the 
Finlandization of Ukraine, and to halt U.S. interference in Russia’s domestic affairs 
through its criticism of Russia for human rights and its democratization policies or lack 
thereof.466 Herpen describes that Graham’s report illustrates the success of Russia’s 
lobbying efforts within the United States as the report reflects policies that Putin himself 
would have wanted the United States to adopt.467 
The Century Foundation, a long-standing think tank in Washington, DC, released 
Graham’s report a little more than one month after Hillary Clinton held a press event with 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in which she theatrically used a red reset button 
to unveil the U.S.-Russian reset policy.468 With the Russian reset, the United States took 
a softer approach with Russia, and the Obama administration withdrew some of the earlier 
policies that had soured U.S.-Russian relations. Kissinger Associates’ efforts and the 
release of Graham’s report may have been coincidental, but it is not without logic to 
surmise that Russia’s investment in its lobbying efforts could have influenced the Obama 
administration to take this softer approach. 
Kissinger Associates is not the only Western lobbying firm that Russia has used to 
exert its influence within the United States. Starting in 2006, Russia hired Ketchum, an 
American lobbying and public relations firm in New York.469 Russia invested millions in 
having Ketchum and its subsidiary company portray the country as more democratic and 
to increase its image in the West after the Russo-Georgian war and its invasion of 
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Crimea.470 Ketchum used its resources to polish the Russian image by “helping them 
disguise all the issues that make[s] [Russia] unattractive: human rights, invasions of 
neighboring countries, etc.” to attract more investment in the country.471 Herpen explains 
that Ketchum also ran a website on behalf of Moscow to project a positive image of the 
country.472 Additionally, he writes that the company published an article in the New York 
Times that Putin wrote wherein he questioned President Obama’s depiction of American 
exceptionalism, cautioned the United States to stay out of the Syrian conflict, and lectured 
the United States on its use of coercion.473 Ketchum provided Putin with an avenue to 
speak directly to the American people as a form of soft power.474 While a foreign country 
hiring a lobbying firm is not abnormal or necessarily considered questionable behavior, it 
still represents one way in which Russia is using its money to purchase agents of influence 
as a form of active measures within the United States. 
Although unclassified, nonpartisan evidence of recruited American agents of 
influence operating under the direction of Russia’s intelligence services is lacking, there 
are examples that indicate Russia still prioritizes identifying and recruiting such assets in 
the United States. In 2010, the FBI concluded a 10-year counterintelligence investigation, 
codenamed Operation Ghost Stories, with the arrest of Anna Chapman and 10 other 
Russian illegal deep-cover agents subordinated to the SVR.475 In addition to traditional 
espionage of collecting sensitive information—or as reported, open-source information 
that the Kremlin thought was important—the SVR tasked these 11 agents with infiltrating 
U.S. political elite circles to identify potential agents of influence.476 According to Frank 
Figliuzzi, former FBI assistant director for counterintelligence, they were succeeding in 
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this endeavor and “several were getting close to high-ranking officials.”477 Figliuzzi did 
not elaborate, but it is reported that one of the illegals, Cynthia Murphy, began cultivating 
a relationship with Alan Patricof—a Democratic fundraiser and friend to both Hillary and 
Bill Clinton—as a potential agent of influence.478 
Another example is the FBI’s recently uncovered investigation of Maria Butina, 
who as of this research was awaiting trial for acting as an unregistered foreign agent of 
Russia. The FBI’s criminal complaint alleges Butina tried to infiltrate a gun rights 
organization—which the media reported was the NRA—to influence U.S. 
policymakers.479 While Butina is not considered an illegal, the FBI’s criminal complaint 
alleges a Russian official—whom the media identified as Aleksander Torshin, the deputy 
governor of the Central Bank of Russia—directed and advised her on how to operate in 
order to develop relationships with those who could facilitate private communications that 
Russia could exploit to influence U.S. decision-makers.480 The FBI alleges Butina set up 
meetings with sitting U.S. politicians and political candidates and relayed information to 
Moscow through a Russian official as an intermediary. The FBI contends that Butina 
developed a relationship with a U.S. political operative who provided her with names of 
American representatives who had influence in U.S. politics. Furthermore, she arranged 
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dinners and meetings wherein she invited the representatives to introduce them to Russian 
officials.481 
While open-source information of post–Cold War agents of influence operating in 
the United States is lacking, there are multiple examples of exposed assets throughout 
Europe. Herpen explains that in 2010, German authorities revealed they had uncovered 
three German citizens who operated as agents of influence for Russia who gained close 
access to the minster president of Brandenburg.482 Herpen indicates that there were two 
examples of Russian agents of influence operating in Britain, one a known Russian SVR 
agent who allegedly influenced a member of UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee, the other, 
a “honeypot,” a Russian female employed as the assistant to a member of Parliament.483 
In both UK examples, Herpen alludes that the targeted politicians seemed to advocate for 
Russia or appeared to be inquisitive on Russia’s behalf regarding Russian-related issues.484 
In France, Herpen explains that Russia was intent on identifying an asset deep within the 
government.485 A Russian attaché who was a known intelligence officer for the GRU met 
with many French prospects who were journalists, officers, and researchers.486 When the 
GRU officer conducted an initial in-person assessment, he already had a significant amount 
of information about them and tried to recruit them by first placating them by offering an 
expensive gift to test their reaction.487 These examples illustrate that Russia still prizes the 
recruitment of agents of influence as a form of active measures and for the most part still 
operates in the same manner as the Soviet Union. 
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4. NGO, GONGOs, and Civic Groups as Front Group Substitutes 
Russia uses state-funded foundations, NGOs, and GONGOs to advance its 
influence. Lutsevych notes that six main state-funded foundations fund a multitude of 
NGOs and GONGOs that Russia uses to influence the so-called Russian World.488 The 
Russian World is an inclusive term that encompasses a vast population set. In a 2014 
speech, Putin offered his interpretation of what makes up the Russian World. He stated, 
“When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens, I am referring to those people 
who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community, they may not necessarily 
be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people.”489 Lutsevych explains 
that the “narratives of the Russian world encompasses language, culture, history, shared 
heritage, economic links, religion and conservative values.”490 Russia uses this broad 
definition to justify its action in the post-Soviet space or wherever there are people who fit 
into this category. Russia tries to portray itself as the protector of a forgotten and mistreated 
people. Although it is difficult to accurately assess due to a lack of transparency, Lutsevych 
estimates Russia invests approximately $130 million each year in groups that are focused 
on expanding Russia’s strategic interests, with most of the money going toward influencing 
the post-Soviet space.491 
Within the Russian World, Russia uses pseudo-NGOs and GONGOs to create an 
us-versus-them mentality against the West. These groups are not like Western NGOs, and 
instead of being independent they are in fact loyal to the Kremlin. The groups have close 
ties to Russia’s intelligence services, and most of the NGOs are run by those who are well 
connected to the Russian government.492 Russia portrays these groups as independent to 
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create the illusion that they are grassroots groups primarily supported by the local 
community. Russia uses the groups to portray Western traditions and values as contrary to 
traditional Russian values, and that the expansion of such Western institutions as NATO 
and the EU is a direct threat to the ethnic Russian communities.493 Moscow highlights the 
United States as the enemy resolved in becoming the sole hegemonic power throughout 
Europe.494 The intent behind the narratives seemed aimed at creating subversion within 
communities against national governments, pushing the Russian World away from the 
West, and convincing these communities that their best interests are to align with Russia. 
These efforts are especially prevalent within countries wherein the government has 
indicated a desire to form closer ties or integrate with the West.495 
Russia has created or promoted NGOs and GONGOs that are similar to Soviet front 
groups designed to legitimize Russia’s interests and act as a counterweight to 
internationally recognized organizations. One area where this is most prevalent is in 
election monitoring in Russia and the post-Soviet space. A particular NGO that has 
liberally aligned itself with Russian interests is the Commonwealth of Independent States-
Election Monitoring Organization (CIS-EMO), which claims to be an unbiased 
independent election-monitoring organization.496 In 2003, a former Russian politician 
created CIS-EMO, and throughout the years its observers have consisted of people who are 
by no means impartial; instead, they are aligned with Russia’s foreign policies.497 CIS-
EMO has observed elections in Russia, a few European countries, multiple former Soviet 
states, and in unrecognized breakaway territories that international organizations refused 
to monitor.498  
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CIS-EMO has released reports and statements that typically validate fraudulent 
elections or raise questions about legitimate elections that did not end favorably for 
Russia’s strategic interests.499 For the most part, CIS-EMO election findings are contrary 
to internationally recognized organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which has 
historically been unbiased.500 Russia has also promoted other Russian-aligned election-
monitoring organizations such as the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy and Elections, 
the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis, and the Cooperation with Civic Control.501 
Russia legitimizes and supports these NGOs and GONGOs because they validate the 
Kremlin’s authoritarian style of democratic governance and further its strategic interests 
abroad. 
Russia also largely uses the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a mechanism for 
Russian influence. Herpen illustrates that the ROC is fiercely faithful to the Kremlin and 
essentially acts as an extension of the state, reaffirming its policies.502 He explains that 
when the patriarch visited Ukraine in 2009, he gave speeches that seemed like they were 
coming from Russian state officials and not from a man of religion.503 Russia’s use of the 
ROC as a tool of Russian influence was illustrated when Lavrov emphasized that the 
church has a role “in solving the tasks of strengthening our Fatherland and establishing the 
most favorable conditions for the further development of the country.”504 Herpen remarks 
that Putin echoed this sentiment when he indicated the ROC “had always played a ‘special 
role’ in Russia, different from the role of religion in other countries: ‘It was a source of 
Russian statehood.’”505 These two statements show the Kremlin’s intent to utilize the 
church as a form of Russian influence. While it is not identical to the front groups of the 
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Soviet Union, the church does fulfill the role of Soviet fronts in exerting influence well 
beyond Russia’s borders as well as being from a source that should seemingly be void of 
government influence. 
Russia has co-opted far-right fringe groups to support Russian influence. Carpenter 
writes that Russia is using its intelligence services to coordinate with and recruit 
“skinheads, biker gangs, soccer hooligans, and street fighters” as a means of influence 
aimed at weakening Western democratic institutions.506 Carpenter explains that Russia 
targets these groups because they are like-minded to Russian policy in which they are more 
inclined to believe nationalistic views over institutional convergence. Additionally, these 
groups include spirited young members whom the Kremlin can use to initiate anti-
government and social protests. Carpenter writes that Russia has supported neo-Nazi 
groups and cites the example of Hungarian National Front, which conducted weapons-
training events that GRU agents under diplomatic immunity attended.507 While the groups 
do not represent the mainstream view of a nation, Russia can leverage them to promote 
subversion within a country and create exploitable situations that portray the government 
as illegitimate or paint the country under the broad strokes of hate groups. 
A Russian group that has become infamous in Eastern Europe and Russia is the 
Night Wolves, an outlaw motorcycle club turned into a political activist group that travels 
throughout Europe promoting nationalized ideals and independence from Western 
institutions. They hold lavish patriotic concerts and shows as a way to spread their 
influence in which they espouse anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric.508 Russia has 
generously funded the group. In 2014, the Night Wolves received $500,000 in Russian 
state funds and in 2018 they received a Russian grant of $41,000 to support the secession 
of Republika Srpska from Bosnia.509 This group provides Russia with a means of 
intimidation and a force to protect the Russian world in Eastern Europe. The Night Wolves 
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have expanded their influence outside of Russia and have opened chapters in several 
Eastern and Central European countries and Germany.510 While the Night Wolves are only 
one of many groups, it is arguably the most publicly supported by the Russian government 
to the degree that Putin has even participated in the club’s motorcycle rallies. 
In 2016, the Kremlin provided $55,000 to help fund Russia’s Anti-Globalist 
Movement’s second annual conference of the Dialogue of Nations.511 This conference was 
held in Moscow and gathered secessionist leaders from around the world to promote 
secessionist movements outside of Russia. The attendees included secessionist groups from 
California, Texas, Puerto Rico, Ireland, Catalonia, Italy, Donetsk, Lebanon, and other 
former Soviet Republics.512 While Russia’s support for secessionist movements is 
hypocritical, as Russia is highly intolerant of such groups within Russia, supporting these 
movements abroad furthers Russia’s strategic interests through widening societal fissures 
and dividing Western democracies.513 Furthermore, the remote chance that a secessionist 
group succeeds—as what the separatists almost did in Catalonia—means Russia could gain 
a close partner and exponentially expand its influence within these areas. 
Russia is using NGOs and GONGOs as a form of active measures, similar to how 
the Soviet Union used front groups. Russia has substituted the Soviet communist ideology 
with Russian dysphoria and a nationalistic ideology to form a base for its influence 
throughout the world. Russia creates and funds NGOs that promote this ideological 
influence. Russia also promotes fringe groups outside of Russia’s direct control as a way 
to create subversion in Western countries. Russia embraced the value of religious influence 
and adopted the narrative of traditional religious values as a way to attack the West. Unlike 
the Soviet Union, Russia has taken a more overt approach in supporting groups that exert 
Russian influence throughout the world and has portrayed these groups as independent 
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organizations. However, much like the Soviet Union, through its monetary support, there 
is little doubt that Russia lacks control of these groups and is actively using them as a form 
of active measures against the West. 
E. CONCLUSION 
When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia adopted democracy, the world was 
full of optimism that the chapter of conflict between the great powers had finally ended. 
The hope for enduring peace was one that most of the world shared, but it seems this may 
have ended in a false hope. The two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not 
an era of peace; instead, it was an era of reloading. Through Russia’s active measures and 
various other acts, such as the invasion of Crimea, its proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, and 
its invasion of Georgia, Russia has signaled to the world that it views the West as an 
adversary. Russia cannot legitimately compete against the West and must resort to 
asymmetrical means as a way to obtain its strategic objectives. Active measures allow it to 
do so with minimal costs. 
Russia is not closed off from the rest of the world like the Soviet Union, which 
enables it greater ease in deploying active measures to further its strategic interests. 
Compared to the Soviet-era active measures, the interconnected world has allowed Russia 
to penetrate deeper into Western societies. Russia’s active measures capabilities have 
grown in the last decade and will only get stronger as they continue to invest and refine 









V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Russia is using the same active measures techniques that the Soviet Union used 
against the United States and the West during the Cold War. However, Russia’s active 
measures have a much higher chance of success today because through technology, it has 
direct access to the American people. Through its actions, Russia has shown itself as an 
adversary to the United States and the West. Russia will not stop using active measures as 
a form of influence until the costs outweigh the benefits, as its past has shown. Much like 
Reagan did against the Soviet Union, the United States should organize and focus its efforts 
and create a significant deterrence to prevent Russia from using active measures in the 
future.  
This concluding chapter starts by explaining the actions that the United States has 
taken to date to counter Russia’s active measures. It concludes by making 
recommendations for ways in which the United States can deter Russia from using active 
measures in the future and how the United States can increase America’s resilience to 
Russia’s manipulative influence.  
A. CURRENT U.S. COUNTERMEASURES  
After the exposure of Russia’s active measures campaign during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential elections, the U.S. government acted against the Russian government as a 
consequence for its attempt to subvert American democracy. The U.S. government 
expelled 35 intelligence operatives from the United States and closed two Russian-owned 
properties located in the United States that the Kremlin used to facilitate its espionage 
activities against America.514 
The primary way in which the United States has responded to the Russian threat is 
through sanctions. To date, the United States has sanctioned 72 individuals or organizations 
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that were either tied to the Russian defense apparatus or its intelligence sectors.515 The 
sanctions are part of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 
(CAATSA), which was passed to punish those who are part of Russia’s active measures, 
particularly as they relate to cyber-security.516 CAATSA includes provisions that allow 
the U.S. government to issue secondary sanctions to any person or organizations that 
knowingly engage in significant transactions of more than $10 million within a year with 
those who are on the sanctions list.517 Most of those sanctioned as a consequence for 
Russia’s interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election were added as of 20 
September 2018, and most of the previously sanctioned individuals and organizations were 
part of Russia’s defense sectors.518 While CAATSA is a good starting point for sanctions, 
it has failed to produce a significant deterrence as Russia is still using active measures 
throughout Europe and has not de-escalated its efforts in Ukraine and other areas in the 
post-Soviet space. Furthermore, there are reports that Russia has used active measures on 
social media to influence the 2018 U.S. midterm elections.519 
The U.S. Congress has acted to identify Russia’s use of active measures. Congress 
has convened multiple hearings in which it has sought the testimony of senior intelligence 
officials, social media companies, experts on Soviet-era active measures, and experts on 
Russia’s current active measures to understand how Russia is operating and to make 
recommendations on how to defeat and deter Russia’s active measures. Additionally, 
Congress has held social media companies accountable and forcefully encouraged them to 
mitigate the opportunities Russia had to influence the American public and make past 
attempts publicly known. As a result, social media companies such as Twitter and 
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Facebook have identified and removed millions of accounts that Russia may have used in 
its active measures campaign. Furthermore, social media companies such as Facebook now 
clearly identify the entities that purchase advertisements on its platform, which increases 
the transparency of potential influence attempts by both foreign and domestic actors. 
In 2016, the DoS’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), initially charged with 
combatting the propaganda efforts of terrorist cells around the world, also assumed the role 
of countering disinformation efforts of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.520 A 2018 
Minority Staff Report to Congress notes that the DoS has failed to use $20 million of the 
$60 million increase that Congress appropriated for the GEC to fund its new mission set.521  
However, the problem with the GEC is not funding. As Hill explains, the GEC’s 
performance history on combatting the propaganda efforts of terrorists is subpar, and the 
increase of funding will not fix the systemic issues fraught with the GEC.522 Hill points 
out that increasing the workload will only exacerbate the problems within the GEC as it 
lacks leadership and direction.523 The Minority Staff Report to Congress indicates that as 
of January 2018, “the administration has yet to appoint a Special Envoy and Coordinator 
of the Global Engagement Center, suggesting that the administration does not consider the 
GEC’s new mission of countering foreign state propaganda a priority.”524 Failing to staff 
this position may contribute to the inability of the GEC, and to make things worse, as of 
October 2018, the position was still vacant. Having an effective entity focused on 
identifying and countering Russia’s active measures is a critical component in the fight 
against Russia’s malevolent influence, and the answer may not reside in a large agency that 
focuses on all forms of foreign disinformation. 
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The National Security Strategy (NSS) for 2018 indicates that the Russian active 
measures threat and similar acts from other states are a threat to U.S. national security.525 
The NSS lists broad actions the government will take to minimize this risk, which include 
developing an understanding of adversarial tactics, creating an effective strategic 
communications plan centered on public diplomacy, exposing propaganda and 
disinformation efforts, updating the U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and incorporating 
private enterprises against the fight of malevolent influence.526 Including the active 
measures threat into the NSS is an important step in deterring Russia from using them 
against the United States. However, public statements from senior government officials 
that Russia did not intervene in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections counteracts the 
strategic efforts to deter Russia. Such statements contradict the NSS and illustrate that the 
United States lacks a strategic public diplomacy effort against Russia’s malevolent 
influence. Refusing to acknowledge Russia’s culpability only emboldens Russia to 
continue its active measures against the United States and the West. 
The United States has taken other steps aimed at combatting Russia’s influence. In 
2017, through the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the DoJ required Russia’s external 
media, RT America to register as a foreign agent, which increases the transparency of the 
RT’s operations and funding.527 The DoJ has also actively pursued Russian attempts at 
recruiting agents of influence. Coupled with the Mueller indictments, the DoJ has 
attempted to send the message that the U.S. government will hold those accountable who 
engage in activities to subvert American democracy.  
The United States has increased its capacity to engage with the people of Eastern 
Europe and Russia. In 2017, the BBG—rebranded as the USAGM on August 22, 2018—
formally launched Current Time, a television broadcasting initiative created to provide 
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Russian speakers in Russia and Eastern Europe truthful reporting of political events that 
affect its audience and explain American policies.528 It currently operates a network 
delivering content to “Russia and nearly 30 other countries, including the Baltics, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Central Asia.”529 Although it operates 24/7, only 38.5 
hours per week is original content.530 According to the Minority Staff Report, if the U.S. 
government doubled Current Time’s funding, the network could quadruple its original 
content and deliver live news coverage round the clock.531 Current Time also has a robust 
and rapidly growing online presence, wherein it manages social media profiles on both 
American- and Russian-based platforms and has its own YouTube channel.532 Creating 
this network is a great initiative aimed at combatting Russia’s manipulation of the Russian 
dysphoria in Eastern Europe and one that the United States should increase. 
The VOA and RFE/RL operate several other radio, television, and online media 
networks aimed at people living in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. According to a 2017 
Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting—
which is the most recent publicly released report on the U.S. public diplomacy efforts—
there are 21 U.S. government–operated radio, television, and online broadcasting networks 
available in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.533 The report indicates that only four of these 
networks—Current Time included—are on the air more than 50 percent of the week, and 
of these networks, only one dedicates more than 50 percent of its on-air time to original 
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programming.534 As a result, much like the Minority Staff Report suggests about Current 
Time, it seems these other networks are underfunded as well, which potentially inhibits 
them from connecting with a broader audience and countering Russia’s malevolent 
influence in this area. 
Another instrument the VOA and RFE/RL created to counter Russian active 
measures is Polygraph.info. Polygraph.info offers platforms in both Russian and English 
and functions as a fact-checking site in which journalists expose Russia’s 
disinformation.535 The website has a simple layout modeled after other well-known 
independent fact-checking sites wherein journalists rate the veracity of stories from the 
Russian media and statements from Russian officials.536 This modest operation has had 
successes in countering Russia’s disinformation.  
One highly successful revelation came as a result of the February 2018 Russian 
mercenary attack against U.S. troops in Syria, for which Putin initially denied there was 
any Russian involvement.537 A journalist at Polygraph.info obtained and publicly released 
an audio recording that implicated Russian mercenaries in the attack and detailed that 200 
Russians had died during the attack.538 This revelation forced Putin to backtrack on his 
previous statement and admit that Russian citizens were indeed fighting in Syria and that 
a significant number died in the attack against U.S. forces.539 This example illustrates the 
impact that Polygraph.info and similar initiatives can have in the fight against Russia’s 
active measures; however, Polygraph.info cannot support ‘round-the-clock operations as it 
is only staffed with five people.540 Increasing the capacity of this organization could 
significantly enhance U.S. efforts in countering Russia’s active measures against the West. 
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Various agencies within the U.S. government have created groups dedicated to 
thwarting and educating the public on Russian active measures and influence operations 
from multiple countries. The FBI established the Foreign Influence Task Force to 
investigate foreign influence attempts and coordinate with numerous companies, 
organizations, and local law enforcement regarding foreign efforts to disseminate 
disinformation or influence the American public, especially as it relates to U.S. 
elections.541 Also, the task force created a website wherein they uploaded a series of videos 
titled “Protected Voices,” which is focused on educating political campaigns and the public 
on how to practice better cyber-security to prevent adversaries from stealing data that 
Russia could later use in an active measures campaign.542 The National Security Agency 
and the U.S. Cyber Command created a joint task force named the Russia Small Group, 
which is tasked with identifying and combatting Russian influence in the cyber realm.543 
However, the group is shrouded in secrecy, and the U.S. government has not publicly 
revealed any details on the group’s activities. 
The United States has taken a more aggressive cyber approach against foreign 
actors that could prove to be a considerable deterrence against Russia’s use of active 
measures. In August 2018, the Trump administration rescinded Presidential Policy 
Directive 20, which required the U.S. military to get approval before engaging in offensive 
cyber operations.544 Rescinding this directive provides the U.S. Cyber Command greater 
latitude in its ability to launch cyber-offensive operations against a foreign adversary, and 
it signals that the United States is taking a more aggressive approach in protecting the U.S. 
national security.545 The national security advisor to the president, John Bolton, echoed 
this new aggressive approach and sent a warning to U.S. adversaries when he stated, “For 
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any nation that’s taking cyber activity against the United States, they should expect … we 
will respond offensively as well as defensively.”546 A little over a month after Bolton made 
this statement, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Cyber Command was tracking 
and messaging Russian operatives who were involved in online influence operations.547 
The article does not elaborate on the exact content of the messages, but it indicates that the 
messages were nonthreatening and the intent behind the messages was to inform the 
operatives that the United States knew their identity and was watching their online activity 
in an attempt to deter future influence operations against U.S. elections.548 
The United States has also supported initiatives in Europe to counter Russia’s active 
measures. The 2018 Minority Staff Report to Congress notes that the United States operates 
the Russian Information Group that focuses on combating Russian disinformation in 
Ukraine; however, the report notes that a senior U.S. military official testified that the 
group needed additional funding, staffing, and greater authority to be more effective.549 
The report explains that the United States is a contributing participant of Finland’s 
European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which focuses on 
conducting “research and training to improve participants’ readiness to respond to cyber-
attacks, disinformation, and propaganda.”550 The United States is also a sponsoring nation 
of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, which focuses on cyber 
defense research and training and conducts annual multinational exercises that test a 
nation’s ability to defend against various cyber-attacks.551 Throughout Europe and in the 
United States, there are individual think tanks, organizations, and programs that contribute 
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in the fight against Russian active measures, which the United States may be funding 
through grants or other means. 
B. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
While the United States has taken steps to counter Russia’s active measures, more 
should be done as there are apparent lacks in its ability to effectively deter Russia from 
using active measures. According to a Director of National Intelligence press release dated 
October 19, 2018, Russia has not stopped its efforts of influence and it “may seek to 
influence voter perceptions and decision making in the 2018 and 2020 U.S. elections.”552 
As a result of this assessment, it appears that the steps the United States has taken thus far 
have not created enough of a deterrence to convince Russia that the costs of using active 
measures outweigh the benefits.  
In comparison to how the Reagan administration countered Soviet active measures, 
the United States currently lacks a concentrated approach at mitigating Russia’s influence. 
The Reagan administration made it a national priority to counter Soviet active measures, 
adequately invested in its countermeasures, and made a concerted effort to publicly reveal 
the Soviet attempts to use deceptive influence. They made it clear that the Soviet Union’s 
use of active measures was not acceptable and would not go unanswered. Currently, it 
seems the United States is taking a minimalist approach to counter and deter Russia’s active 
measures. U.S. countermeasures are underfunded, which detracts from its capability and 
because of the political polarization, the United States has not delivered a coherent message 
that Russia will be held accountable for its use of active measures. The longer it takes the 
United States to develop an effective deterrence, the more advanced Russia’s capability 
will become, which will make it much more difficult to deter in the future.  
The United States must act similarly as the Reagan administration did against the 
Soviet Union. The United States should organize purposefully and consistently to counter 
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Russian active measures and implement policies that significantly increase the costs of 
using such forms of malevolent influence. Additionally, because Russia has greater access 
to the American people, the United States should invest in educating its citizens to increase 
their resiliency against disinformation. Based on the research in this thesis, the United 
States should consider taking the following actions to stop Russia from using active 
measures against the West:  
1. Impose Sanctions 
The United States should heavily increase sanctions against those who facilitate 
Russia’s active measures. The United States could strengthen CAATSA and reduce the 
secondary sanction transaction limits to zero, which will increase the deterrence of those 
who wish to harm the United States and the West. Any person or organization that the 
United States has confirmed as being part of Russia’s active measures should be added to 
CAATSA. This list should include all the department heads and senior leaders of the 
directorates that make up Russia’s active measures apparatus and potentially their 
immediate family members, as well as any privately owned organizations and companies 
that help facilitate Russia’s active measures. Before adding anyone to the sanctions list, the 
United States should publicly warn those considered for sanctions of the consequences for 
continuing to perpetuate Russia’s malevolent influence. Hopefully, this public warning will 
deter individuals from implementing active measures; however, if they fail to stop, the 
United States must be willing to apply the heaviest sanctions possible to reduce their access 
to the United States and the West and to constrict any financial gains through Western 
businesses. The United States should also petition its allies to implement similar sanctions, 
which will create a unified front and greater deterrence against Russia. 
2. Develop an Interagency Focused on Russian Active Measures 
The United States should increase its capability to identify Russia’s active 
measures. During the Cold War, the Reagan administration created the AMWG, which 
solely focused on collecting and disseminating well-vetted intelligence on Russia’s active 
measures and increased the political costs for the Soviet Union. The United States should 
refocus its efforts away from a large agency like the GEC; instead, it should create a smaller 
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interagency much like the AMWG, specializing in only Russian active measures. This 
agency should be well funded and staffed with experts from the many different government 
and private institutions that focus on Russian influence. Additionally, the agency must be 
given the highest authority to execute its mission unimpeded from political influence, 
bureaucratic hurdles, and over-classification burdens that limit publicly revealing Russian 
tactics. The agency should develop working relationships with experts from social media 
companies to provide accurate real-time threat information on Russia’s online active 
measures. At a minimum, the agency should produce unclassified semi-annual reports on 
Russia’s active measures techniques, tactics, and procedures that are highly publicized and 
widely disseminated throughout the world. The United States should also petition its allies 
to create similar agencies that can cross-check and share information on Russia’s active 
measures.  
3. Create Strategic Communications against Russia’s Malevolent 
Influence 
Much like the Reagan administration did, the current administration should create 
a unified strategic communications plan centered on exposing Russia’s use of active 
measures and its hypocritical acts against human rights and democracy. All U.S. 
government officials must be committed to the communications strategy and publicly 
confront Russia on its malevolent influence throughout the world. The United States should 
label Russia as an adversary and use the many different international public platforms to 
truthfully speak out against Russia and highlight its unacceptable behaviors. Furthermore, 
the United States should release any verified information on Russian officials’ corruption, 
to include Putin’s corruption. However, the United States must ensure that the information 
that is released is accurate to limit Russia’s ability to legitimately deny the allegations. If 
Russia fails to abandon its use of active measures, the United States should work with its 
allies to isolate Russia from the rest of the world. All of these acts should be transparent 
and forewarned to Russia and the Russian people as a deterrent to alter its behavior.  
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4. Increase International Broadcasting Capability 
The United States should double-down and heavily invest in its international 
broadcasting efforts in Russia, Central Asia, and Europe, especially Central and Eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, it should restructure the USAGM to become more aligned with a 
stringent strategic communications policy aimed at combating all forms of Russian 
influence. Currently, the USAGM has too much leniency in what it chooses to report, and 
there should be more government control. The USAGM needs to develop the capacity to 
deliver live breaking news coverage—much like the major 24-hour news networks in 
America—in all languages in the post-Soviet space. These broadcasting stations must also 
maintain accessible, relevant, and content-rich websites, and to enhance outreach, the 
broadcasting stations should create an extensive social media presence on all social media 
platforms used in its area of responsibility. Increasing the international broadcasting 
capability will significantly increase the expense of the USAGM, but in the information 
war against Russia, international broadcasting will become the United States’ most lethal 
weapon, much like it was during the Cold War.  
5. Promote Fact-Checking 
With an increase in funding for broadcasting, the USAGM should significantly 
enhance the capabilities of Polygraph.info. Polygraph.info should have the ability to work 
‘round the clock at debunking Russian disinformation that attacks the United States and 
the West. Additionally, the United States should also either create or fund and publicize a 
non-partisan fact-checking organization that is focused on exposing disinformation within 
the United States. The American public should have easy access to this information, which 
will help develop a better-informed citizenry. Additionally, the government should require 
social media companies to post links on its users’ profiles that allow users easy access to 
fact-check information they encounter on social media. While the government cannot force 
people to use fact-checking websites, it should encourage the verification of information 
and make it simple for users to become better informed.  
115 
6. Institute Offensive Cyber Operations 
The United States should go further with its offensive cyber-operations against 
foreigners who conduct hacking operations or facilitate Russia’s online active measures. It 
is not enough to warn the perpetrators that they are being watched. Instead, the United 
States should raise the costs and destroy their capability to conduct future attacks against 
the American people. The United States should conduct offensive cyber-attacks to damage 
the computer equipment used to perform hacks or to rapidly spread disinformation, such 
as the IRA. The United States should limit its offensive cyber-operations only to destroy 
the computers and equipment used to facilitate Russia’s active measures and not attack 
Russia’s civilian infrastructure. Russia’s senior military officers have essentially admitted 
the tactics they use in the information space as an act of war; therefore, the U.S. government 
must be willing to degrade Russia’s capability to wage war against the United States, and 
offensive cyber operations can achieve this objective through limited and focused attacks 
against the actual perpetrators. 
7. Build Resiliency through Education 
The United States must build up Americans’ resiliency to Russia’s active measures. 
During the Cold War, a significant amount of Russian disinformation was filtered and did 
not reach the public through the use of editors and professional journalists. Currently, the 
Internet has dramatically reduced the filter because anyone can post information online that 
can become widely disseminated. Due to this lack of protection, the United States must 
invest in enhancing the American public’s resiliency to disinformation. To create resiliency 
for future generations, the United States should mandate that middle and high schools 
incorporate more media literacy and critical thinking skills into their curriculums. These 
lessons should teach students to think for themselves and not believe everything they are 
told without proper verification. Not only should the United States prepare the new 
generations, but it should also focus on building resiliency in older generations. To fulfill 
this requirement, the United States should create a series of short, entertaining public 
service announcements that detail ways in which citizens can guard against falling prey to 
Russia’s active measures. The government can create videos tailored to age demographics 
116 
and mandate social media companies deliver these announcements to profiles based on the 
age of the users. Essentially, the social media companies would treat the public service 
announcements in the same manner as they do to deliver paid advertisements. Additionally, 
the government should create a website linked to the advertisements that provides greater 
detail on how people can protect themselves and the latest information on Russia’s active 
measures tactics and campaigns.  
Giving Americans the information to protect themselves will act as a shield against 
the manipulative effects of Russia’s active measures. Not only will education better protect 
Americans from Russian disinformation, but it will also create a more well-informed 
society that can sift through the deafening noise from the polarized political atmosphere. 
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